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 ABSTACT 
The Effects of Patriotic Education on Chinese Youths’ Perceptions of Japan 
by 
WU Zeying, Zena 
Master of Philosophy 
 
This study tries to address a research question on what effects Chinese 
patriotic education has on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan. The question is 
raised from a recent discussion on the issue of whether the “patriotic education 
campaign” since 1989 has led to anti-Japanese sentiments in China. 
Guided by the research question, this study particularly looks at the impacts 
of patriotic education in schools on Chinese students’ perceptions of Japan. 
While aware of the theoretical arguments and the focus on Chinese historical 
narrative of Japan in previous research, this study instead serves as an empirical 
examination on the topic and emphasizes the importance of students’ reactions in 
determining the effects of Chinese patriotic and history education in schools. 
This study thus is primarily based on the empirical data collected from 
fieldworks and surveys. Comparative and content analyses were also employed 
to examine relevant official documents and the history textbooks in secondary 
schools.  
Based on these empirical and comparative examinations, this study on the 
one hand concludes that the historical narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic 
curriculum, though it has been more negative than positive, has been consistent 
since 1989, when the Chinese government attempted to reform and strengthen its 
patriotic education and emphasized on the history of the “Chinese humiliation 
century.” In addition, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced 
to students with a reformed history curriculum since 2001. This study, on the 
other hand, also discovers that nowadays Chinese youths tend to perceive Japan 
in a multi-faceted and rational way, that their understandings of Japan and 
Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the historical narrative 
of Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum, and that Chinese youths 
today tend to resist the message likely embedded with the political-ideological 
indoctrination in the school curriculum. Due to the stronger influences from the 
Internet and other mass media, the conflicting effects of textbooks and teachers 
as well as Chinese students’ superficial receptions and “digestion” of the 
information from schools, this study reveals the weak effects of Chinese patriotic 
education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and Literature Reviews  
The last two decades have seen large-scale street demonstrations and online 
petitions against Japan across Mainland China, although economic exchanges, on the 
other hand, have boomed between China and Japan.
1 
Nationwide anti-Japanese 
protests in 1996, 2003, 2005 and 2010, for example, were highly visible cases. There 
were also large-scale demonstrations against the United States and other western 
countries by Chinese living inside and outside mainland China in the last two 
decades, for instance, the nationwide demonstrations against the United States in 
response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the demonstrations against western counties in 
response to Tibet issues and western media bias during the Beijing Olympic torch 
relay in 2008. Nonetheless, street demonstrations and online petitions against Japan 
have been much more consistently visible.  
The last two decades similarly have seen Chinese holding consistently negative 
attitudes toward Japan. As showed by public opinion polls concluded by both China 
and Japan since 1988, Chinese perceptions of Japan have been consistently negative 
since the mid-1990s (Kobayashi 2008).Triggered by different disputes and incidental 
events, as we saw, the frequent street demonstrations and online petitions against 
Japan in China usually involved Chinese youths in their 20s as major participants 
(Wang 2009: 800).  
Why do Chinese still harbor consistently negative feelings toward Japan while 
older generations, who had direct experiences of the war and occupation, have been 
passing away and the younger generation has grown up with all kinds of Japanese 
products and Japanese cultural influences in their lives? Why have large-scale street 
                                                             
 
1
According to the figures drawn from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the value of the mutual 
trade between China and Japan had grown from $12 billion in 1990 to $83 billion in 2000 when it 
accounted for more than 22% of China's total trade in 2000. Also, according to the latest report released 
by Japan External Trade Organization, compared to 2010 Japan’s total trade with China rose 14.3% to 
US$344.9 billion in 2011, setting a new record. This number is expected to a reach record high 
exceeding US$350 billion in 2012. See http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20120223142-news, 
accessed in Feb. 2, 2012.  
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demonstrations and online petitions against Japan frequently occurred across 
Mainland China in the past two decades despite increased economic and social 
exchanges between China and Japan?   
Explorations of these questions bring about extensive discussions and in-depth 
analyses on Chinese perceptions of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations from different 
perspectives. Among those discussions and analyses, two main arguments can be 
broadly concluded. While one suggests that Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments (if 
there are any) are deliberately disseminated by the Chinese government for or 
through promoting nationalism, the other argues that anti-Japanese sentiments in 
China (if there are any) are deeply embedded within historical trauma and current 
disputes rather than being a product of manipulation.2 
Given China’s rise as an economic, political, and military power, as has been 
argued by many scholars, the last two decades have coincided with a resurgence of 
Chinese nationalism through a nationwide “patriotic education campaign” across 
mainland China.
3 
The “patriotic education campaign” launched by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1990s, which emphasizes the traumatic 
experiences mainly resulting from the invasion by Japan during China’s “humiliation 
century” and the CCP’s contributions to riding China and its people of the 
humiliation, especially of Japan’s invasion, is thus believed to be aimed at promoting 
Chinese (Chinese youths in particular) nationalist feelings toward Japan, so as to 
legitimize the CCP regime and sustain social stability.
4 
 
This argument, as Japanese scholar Shogo Suzuki (2007) concluded, is 
increasingly popular in the context of a legitimacy crisis of the CCP within China in 
the late 1980s. It also strongly relies on the assumption that Chinese nationalism is 
rooted in China’s wartime past and that the Chinese leadership is capable of 
strategically utilizing historical memory to suit its interests. On the heels of these 
assumptions, both politicians and scholars believe that Chinese patriotic education 
serves as a pragmatic tool to nurture anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese, 
                                                             
 
2
 For the first point of view, see, for example, Callahan (2006, 2007); Gries (2005); He (2007, 2009); 
Mitter (2000); Zhao (1998, 2004). For the second point of view, see, for example, Liu (2007); Jiang 
(2005); Wang (2008); Suzuki (2007). 
3
 There have been a number of surveys on the rise of Chinese nationalism, see, for examples, Gries 
(2004); Hughes (2006); Whiting (1995); Zheng (1999) and etc. 
4
 For this view, see especially Zhao Suisheng’ s works (1998, 2004). Also see, for example, Barme 
(1995); Callahan (2006); Chen (2005); Cohen (2002); He (2007); Gries (2005).   
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especially Chinese youths.
5 
 
When large-scale anti-Japanese protests burst out across Mainland China in 
2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura at that time connected 
China’s anti-Japanese sentiments with China’s history-based education, claiming 
China should ‘‘modify’’ its education concerning history. He also cited, “a survey 
released by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun in April 2005 indicated that more than 80% of 
Japanese respondents believed that China’s nationalistic education system 
encouraged Chinese anti-Japanese protests” (Los Angeles Times, 8 May 2005). This 
argument actually had existed in Japan much earlier. From 27 February to 23 March 
2001, for example, a Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun carried a series of 
twenty-one articles on the teaching of history in China, offering detailed support for 
what many had been writing: the Chinese leadership buttress growing nationalism by 
presenting Japanese history more negatively and stirring public opinion towards 
increased animosity (Rozman 2002: 119). Almost ten years later when the boat 
collision incident happen between China and Japan in September 2010, an editorial 
entitled “China shouldn't stir up anti-Japanese sentiments” was released by Yomiuri 
Shimbun, similarly criticizing that China has instilled this belief [Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands belong to China] among its people through "anti-Japanese patriotism" 
education since the 1990s (Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 September 2010).  
In Japanese academia, the same arguments over Chinese nationalism and 
patriotic history education are getting more popular as well. Quite a number of 
Japanese scholars, Akio Takahara in the University of Tokyo, for instance, believes 
that China’s rising self-confidence in the nation, which reacts on the remaining sense 
of inferiority and promotes nationalism of an aggressive nature, is a structural cause 
of the tension between China and Japan (Takahara 2005:41). It is thus also argued by 
some Japanese scholars that the history-based patriotic education in China has been 
an important contributing factor for the Chinese peoples’ consistently negative 
perceptions of Japan (Kobayashi 2008).          
Although China and Japan fought a traumatic war from 1937 to 1945, they did 
                                                             
 
5
 Numerous works have discussed the negative influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese 
relations. See, for example, Appenrodt (2008); Calder (2005); Callahan (2009); Chan and Bridges 
(2006); Gong and Teo (2010); He (1998, 2007, 2009); Hughes (2006, 2008); Jiang (2006); Moore 
(2010); Wang (2008); Zhao (2000).    
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not start to quarrel about history until the early 1980s, when the majority of the 
populations in both countries no longer had a direct experience of the war and the 
two countries had developed closer economic and social ties. By questioning why 
this happened between China and Japan, Chinese scholar He Yinan (2007: 44) 
believed that the fundamental cause of international political conflict over history lies 
in the intentional manipulation of history by ruling elites, or national mythmaking, 
for instrumental purposes; the national mythmaking in both China and Japan thus has 
led to the mistrust between Chinese and Japanese and the failure of Sino-Japanese 
reconciliation. On China’s side, He (2009) suggested that the “patriotic education 
campaign”, which was promoted by the CCP leaders to sustain its legitimacy since 
1989, has contributed to the volatile Sino-Japanese relations at both official and 
popular levels.    
However, is it true? Are the Chinese, especially Chinese youths, harboring such 
strong anti-Japanese sentiments? Is a state-led “anti-Japanese patriotic education 
campaign” really going on in China? Does Chinese patriotic education necessarily 
lead to anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese?  
While more and more critics point to the Chinese “patriotic education 
campaign” since 1989, blaming it as a trigger for anti-Japanese sentiments among 
Chinese, particularly among Chinese youths, Japanese scholar Suzuki (2007:27) 
refuted these critics, suggesting that although it is indeed true that the CCP has 
promoted some form of patriotism to legitimize itself, it does not necessarily follow 
that anti-Japanese sentiments per se are deliberately disseminated. He further pointed 
out several crucial flaws such critics should confront: 1) a growth in popular 
anti-Japanese sentiments may not secure the stability of CCP regime but instead 
could result in the destructions of foreign property; 2) historical perceptions do 
matter and thus it is unlikely for any Chinese leadership to be autonomous from 
history memories; 3) Japanese imperialism can be used for regime legitimating only 
when the rhetoric has “resonance” with the Chinese populace. 
For many Chinese, as Chinese scholar Wang Zheng (2008:800-801) asserted, 
the foreign invasions, the military defeats, the unequal treaties and all the details of 
invaders’ atrocities during the “100 years of national humiliation” are not merely a 
recounting of national history; Chinese people learn these sad stories not only from 
history textbooks or patriotic education activities, but also from their parents and 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
grandparents. Although Wang (2008) believed that the institutionalized historical 
discourses about the country’s traumatic national experiences have profoundly 
influenced young people’s perceptions of the outside world, Wang also agreed with 
Suzuki’s argument and believed that without comprehension of the primordial 
background of Chinese nationalism, we would not be able to fully understand why 
Chinese elite-led top-down propaganda campaign could have realized its objectives 
of enhancing the regime’s political legitimacy and improving social solidarity.  
By reviewing the existing literature on Chinese nationalism, Allen Carlson 
(2009) has also criticized that in the absence of a broader set of comparisons and 
empirical observations, the existing literature on Chinese nationalism has simply 
assumed a surge of Chinese nationalism in the last two decades as a matter of fact 
and understood Chinese nationalism in terms of exclusionary dichotomies. It is, 
nonetheless, not necessary for Chinese nationalism to bear an exclusionary and 
egoistic nature in the sense that the contemporary construction of national identity in 
China is possible to proceed with transnational and global political space and 
bottom-up narratives of national belongings at the grassroots level (Carlson 2009: 
29-30). Contemporary Chinese nationalism, as Carlson (2009: 29) further suggested, 
may differ from the Chinese nationalism in the old days as well as the nationalism in 
other nations.  
Given the fact that nationalism as a term is seldom used by either the Chinese 
government or academia while patriotism is such a term overused by both Chinese 
government and populace, there have also been debates on whether Chinese 
nationalism is officially substituted for by patriotism. 
In the PRC official discourse, the term “nationalism” is close to “chauvinism”, 
which referred to parochial and reactionary attachments to nationalities, whereas 
“patriotism” is just a love of the Chinese motherland (Zhao 1998: 290). Therefore, 
for many Chinese, patriotism is a term totally different from nationalism. As CCP 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin once emphasized in 1990 “the patriotism we advocate 
is by no means a parochial nationalism.” (Jiang 1990). For many Chinese, patriotism, 
instead, is essentially identical with socialism because “building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” has been officially justified as a common task for all 
Chinese and is the main theme of patriotism in today’s China (Qiang and Fairbrother 
2006:8). As the People’s Daily editorial stated on the 1996 National Day, “Patriotism 
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is specific… Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and road chosen by 
all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party.” (Quoted 
from Zhao 1998: 291).      
However, in the sense that China is such a nation-state with 56 ethnic groups 
and “nationalism” as a term with ethnic connotations which may arouse nationalistic 
fervor among multiple ethnic groups inside China, there has been another argument 
suggesting that Chinese governments have purposely substituted nationalism with 
patriotism in order to ensure Chinese national unity (Gries 2004; Kao 1996; Zheng 
1999). To some extent, patriotism is indeed a more acceptable non-political notion to 
the PRC government as it helps the people to focus on problems and challenges they 
share in common. It acknowledges the ethnic differences among China’s population 
but insists that all are members of a large nation that binds them together by the 
Communist state. It thus helps the Communist Party, who speaks in a nation’s name, 
to successfully demand the citizens to identify themselves with the nation and 
subordinate other interests to those of the state. Characterized by its obvious 
state-centric nature, Chinese patriotism, as was concluded by Zhao (1998), is in fact 
state-led nationalism.   
Due to its state-centric nature, however, some scholars contradictorily argue 
against reducing Chinese patriotism to the western term nationalism. As Michael 
Hunt (1994: 63) observed, “by professing aiguo (love the state), Chinese usually 
expressed loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be 
in its renovated form.” This observation, as aforementioned, is shared by many 
Chinese scholars, officials and populace who believe that Chinese patriotism is such 
a term not equal with the concept of nationalism as understood in the western context 
and bearing egoistic and exclusivist nature, but again, is just a love for the socialist 
state. (Liu 2007; Jiang 2004; Pang 2005).      
Efforts have also been undertaken by Chinese scholars to detach anti-Japanese 
sentiments from Chinese patriotic education. By citing the recent popularity of 
Japanese (and Korean) products and modern culture among Chinese youths, most 
Chinese scholars of Chinese patriotism, instead, have criticized a growth of “national 
nihilism” among Chinese youths nowadays and argued that the Chinese government 
has never intended to instill anti-Japanese sentiments into its general public, but only 
asks its people not to forget historical lessons so as to avoid the recurrence of 
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historical tragedies. They cited Chinese government’s official statements that people 
of both countries should look forward into the future and be friends forever (Jiang 
2005; Shang 2004). Following Mao Zedong’ s logic to distinguish the Japanese 
people from a small batch of Japanese militarists, Chinese scholars also argued, if 
there is anything Chinese history education teaches their students to go against, that 
must be the Japanese imperialism and the war crimes committed by Japanese 
militarists, but by no means the Japanese people (Pang 2005; Liu 2007).
6 
   
Public opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS 
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in 2004, 2006, and 2008 revealed that 
Chinese respondents who chose incomplete reflections on wartime history by the 
Japanese as one of their main reasons for having negative feelings of Japan were 
much more in number than those who chose the history of Japan’s invasion in 
modern China as a reason.7 Based on these survey results, recent attempts have also 
been made to distinguish the history of Japan’s invasion in modern China from 
Japanese current attitudes toward history. In doing so, Chinese governments and 
scholars suggest that what Chinese mostly care about is current Japanese attitudes 
toward history but not the past history itself, and letting people know about the 
history itself is by all means necessary and beneficial for the bilateral relations.8
 
  
 
1.2  Research Question  
Discussions of Chinese nationalism and why Chinese harbor consistently 
negative feelings of Japan are ongoing.9
 
One key aspect of these discussions would 
be Chinese patriotic education and its impacts on Chinese youths’ perceptions of 
Japan. By assuming the high effectiveness of Chinese patriotic education and looking 
at Chinese perceptions of Japan in a dichotomous way, a seemingly popular 
argument sets out that there exist strong anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese 
populace, especially among Chinese youths, and that Chinese patriotic education 
necessarily leads to Chinese youths’ anti-Japanese sentiments. Actually, this has 
                                                             
 
6
 Two textbook designers and two historians I interviewed during my fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing 
also indicated similar ideas. See Chapter III.     
7
 For specific figures, see the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS (2004, 2006, 2009).           
8
 These arguments can be found in Liu (2002); Jiang (2005); and Su (2000).  
9
 There have also been more empirical examinations on Chinese history and patriotic education in 
recent years. See, for example, Fairbrother (2006); Friedman (2008); Jin and Li (2011); Müller et al. 
(2011); Rose (2010); Shin and Sneider et al. (2011). 
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simplified Chinese patriotic education, Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan as well 
as the mechanism of how Chinese patriotic education impacts on Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan in this way:     
 
   
   
        
 
 
 
 
  
 
However, does this very assumption of the “creator-receiver connection” really 
work out in China? If whether Chinese patriotic education per se has impacts on 
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan is not a proper research question to ask since 
the role of school as a political socialization agent has been widely admitted and 
confirmed, the questions of to what extent Chinese patriotic education affects 
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan and what these effects are should definitely be 
proper, and actually important, questions to ask. Thus, this study raises a main 
research question of “what effects of Chinese patriotic education has on Chinese 
youths’ perceptions of Japan?”  
To address this main research question and to question the very assumptions of 
the “creator-receiver connections”, this study accordingly asks sub-questions about 
the “creator”, Chinese patriotic education, in chapter III: 1) What is Chinese patriotic 
education really about? 2) How does Chinese patriotic education actually work out in 
China? 3) What information about Japan does Chinese patriotic education intend to 
teach Chinese youths? In Chapter IV, this study further asks about the reactions of 
the “receivers” — Chinese youths: 4) How do Chinese youths actually perceive 
Japan? 5) How do Chinese youths receive and “digest” the information about Japan 
from the school patriotic curriculum? 
Through answering all these sub-questions respectively addressing the “creator” 
and “receivers,” this study again comes back to its main research question and tries 
to come out with a more genuine picture of how Chinese patriotic education affects 
The “Patriotic Education 
Campaign" since 1989 
History education 
in schools 
Textbooks 
 
Teachers 
Extra-curricular activities  
Students’ 
understanding 
of Japan and 
Sino-Japanese 
relations  
Chinese 
youths’ 
anti-Japanese 
sentiments   
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Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.  
 
1.3 Study Scope  
In response to the aforementioned discussions on “Chinese patriotic education 
campaign” after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and its impacts on Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan, this study principally focuses on the post-1989 patriotic 
education in China. For comparative study, however, it also traces China’s 
ideological-political education back to 1978 when China inaugurated its reform and 
opening-up policy and started an emphasis on patriotic education. Patriotic education, 
as parts of the party-state’s political-ideological education program is indeed broader 
than other forms of schooling and may be hidden in every corner of the society. 
However, in the sense that patriotic education in schools is the most direct reflection 
of state’s political-ideological education and the secondary schooling is taken as the 
core of patriotic education in schools according to the Outline for Implementing 
Patriotic Education,10 this study thus narrows its research subjects down to patriotic 
education and Chinese youths in secondary schools, including both junior and senior 
levels. Within schools, the patriotic education curriculum is also infused in both 
classes and extra-curricular activities to different extents. Regarding the education 
containing information about Japan, as is found from my analysis on China’s 
post-1989 patriotic education and my survey with secondary school students, history 
classes in schools are the classes where most information about Japan are supposed 
to be taught due to Japan’s dominant role in wartime history, 11  and thus is 
particularly emphasized in the “patriotic education campaign” after 1989. Simply put, 
this study focuses on the patriotic history curriculum in secondary schools.            
According to the Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education again, Chinese 
youths, most of whom are under schooling and particularly those in secondary 
schools, are the focus of Chinese patriotic education.12 To examine the direct 
impacts of the patriotic education in secondary schools and address a group of 
Chinese youths who have seldom been addressed in previous studies, this study thus 
                                                             
 
10
 See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” the Selected Archives of Importance since 
the 14
th
 People’s Congress Meeting, p. 925. 
11 
See survey results of Q9 in Appendix II.   
12
 See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” p. 925.  
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focuses on Chinese students in secondary schools and particularly examines their 
reactions to the patriotic history curriculum as well as their perceptions of Japan.13     
    
1.4 Theoretical Framework      
Schools, as one of the most controllable agents for political socialization, have 
also been widely taken as one of most effective socialization agents in influencing 
students’ political attitudes by conveying knowledge and prescribing attitudes 
through the curriculum and textbooks, through the influence of teachers, and through 
children’s participation in extracurricular and ritual activities (Dawson, et al. 1977). 
Empirically, however, scholars in political socialization theory had come to doubt the 
effectiveness of school education as an agent for regimes to justify their rule and 
motivate populations behind national goals. 
Based on their empirical research, Kenneth Langton and Kent Jennings (1968) 
have shown the weak correlations between American high school civic education 
courses and a number of political attitudes. Reviews of other empirical studies have 
also cast doubt upon the effects of the curriculum, teachers, extracurricular activities, 
and the general secondary school experience on students’ political orientations, views, 
values, attitudes, and behavior. 14
 
 
Some explanations for the ineffectiveness of schooling in influencing students’ 
political attitudes lay blame on the contradictory or stronger effects from other 
socialization agents, such as the mass media, family education, peer groups, personal 
experience, etc., while others focus on the structures and actors (teachers and 
students in particular) within schooling itself  (Beck 1977; Langton and Jennings 
1969).   
The explanation of redundancy, for example, asserts that by the time students 
reach secondary school, the political messages of the school are duplicating those 
which students have already encountered in earlier stages of schooling or outside the 
schools (Langton and Jennings 1969). Political messages from secondary schools 
                                                             
 
13
 Previous studies have focused more on Chinese college students for their perceptions of Japan. See 
(Chen (2003); Li and Shi (2005); Sha (2008) and the Public Opinion Polls jointly conducted by China 
Daily and Genron NPO in Japan since 2005. Caroline Rose has recently had an empirical examination 
on Chinese and Japanese civil education in primary schools. See Rose (2010).        
14
 For a summary of these studies, see Fairbrother (2002:22).    
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thus may be just a repetition of those in previous years or echoes of what students 
have heard or are hearing from other sources, which may result in a diminished 
impact between new and old information and consensus among messages students 
receive from schools and other agents of socialization. Students may thus miss or 
ignore what is intended to be taught to them (Dawson, et al. 1977 ).      
Another school-level explanation focuses on the roles of teachers as mediators 
between intended and implemented curriculum. Due to the conflicting demands and 
pressures from administrators, other teachers, parents and students as well as 
problems of education system, such as, examination and curriculum reforms, 
teachers may have to cope with both these conflicting demands and over workload 
through the tactics of “routinizing procedures, modifying goals, rationing services 
and asserting priorities” or a cost-benefit type analysis (Weatherley and Lipsky 1977; 
Clark and Lampert 1986). Therefore, the implemented curriculum may substantially 
differ from the intended one after teachers have specified “how much time will be 
devoted to a subject, what topics will be taught, and how well topics are to be 
learned” (Schwille, et al. 1983, quoted from Fairbrother 2002: 24). With different 
personal experience and educational backgrounds, teachers may also have different 
understandings and interpretations of the intended curriculum. Students thus may 
find conflicts among the interpretations of different teachers on one particular issue 
and compromise their receptions of the messages taught by the teachers (Goodlad 
1986). In this way, to what extent the intended curriculum is actually implemented 
and received by students largely depends on teachers who act as the mediators 
between the intended and implemented curriculum.  
The final explanation focuses on students, who are the “receivers” of the 
schooling and have the final saying of the effectiveness of school education. 
According to Wendy Griswold (1994: 14), cultural objects such as textbooks need 
audiences or receivers who digest the former, and unless cultural objects have 
“people who receive them, people who hear, read, understand, think about, enact, 
participate in, remember them,” their intended messages and cultural meanings 
cannot be enacted. In other words, only when students receive and “digest” the 
information from school curricula, can school curricula have impacts on students. 
Thus, examination on students’ reactions to the schooling is no doubt necessary for 
studying the effects of the schooling.    
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There are various factors, however, affecting students’ reception or “digestion” 
of the message from schools, making examination of students’ reactions to the 
schooling hard and complicated. Students, especially those in their young age, for 
example, may have problems in understanding and grasping political messages due 
to their intrinsic failure to understand certain complex and abstract political concepts 
(Hess and Torney 1967). Also, students’ interests in the content, their relationships 
with teachers, their exposure to the other information resources and their 
personalities as well as personal experiences may all contribute to their reception and 
“digestion” of the messages from schools (Dawson, et al., 1977).  
As suggested by Fairbrother based on his comparative and empirical study on 
the patriotic education and students’ national identity in Mainland China and Hong 
Kong, students’ critical thinking (or in Henry Giroux’s word, “resistance”) of the 
political message from schools may tell better stories of Chinese students’ reaction to 
their political schooling and explain why political socialization messages may not 
come to be fully accepted and taken in by students in China.  
According to Giroux’s “resistance” theory (1983a), schools as one of the 
controllable institutions for political socialization, represent the interests of the 
dominant group in society. This may cause students’ perceptions of “hegemony” or 
the unequal relations between the dominants and the subordinates. In the situation 
when students find incongruity between the political messages they are being taught 
in schools and alternative messages from other groups or actors in society, the 
perception of “hegemony” may lead students to resist the political messages from 
schools (Fairbrother 2002: 30).           
A reaction of “resistance”, as Giroux (1983a: 291) noted, should involve 
“critical thinking and reflective action.” Critical thinking, as defined by Catherine D. 
Ennis (1996), is “reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe 
or do” (p.10, quoted from Fairbrother (2002: 34)). It engages in “a certain skepticism, 
or suspension of assent, towards a given statement, established norm or mode of 
doing things… it considers alternative hypotheses and possibilities” (McPeck 1981: 
6). 
With critical thinking, as Fairbrother’s empirical research found out, Mainland 
students in China exhibited their skepticism toward the hegemonic political 
socialization in schools although they did not completely deny the influence of the 
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schooling and took advantage of those aspects of the schooling experience which 
could be viewed as less like indoctrination, extracurricular activities and 
encouragement to form their own attitudes toward the nation, as well as the relatively 
free intellectual atmosphere of the university (Fairbrother 2002: 198). Students’ 
individual perceptions and other socialization factors, as further shown by 
Fairbrother’s survey data, partially detracted from Mainland students’ patriotism and 
nationalism through fostering and interacting with their critical thinking (Fairbrother 
2002: 258).  
Regarding the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan, can Chinese patriotic curricula in schools succeed in cultivating 
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan by telling the historical stories about 
Sino-Japanese wars and Japan’s invasion in modern China when Chinese youths 
nowadays have grown up with numerous Japanese products and Japanese 
contemporary cultures rather than with direct experience of Sino-Japanese wars? 
With many more economic and social exchanges between China and Japan and in a 
relatively more liberal Chinese society with both globalization and new 
communication structures today, to what extent does the information about Japan 
from the school curricula contribute to students’ understanding of Japan and 
Sino-Japanese relations? Also, with pressures from all kinds of examinations in the 
Chinese educational system and students’ pragmatic approaches to deal with the 
coursework in schools, how well, then, do students “digest” the school curricula, and 
particularly the message about Japan from schools?  
These questions are definitely necessary and important to be answered if one 
would like to judge the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan. Without further inquiry on these questions, one can hardly 
make assumptions on the effects of Chinese patriotic education or even blame it as a 
trigger for Chinese youths’ anti-Japanese sentiments.   
 
1.5 Research Methods  
While being aware of numerous existing theoretical arguments on Chinese 
nationalism/patriotism (education) and its history narratives (and production), this 
study, instead, intends to have an empirical survey on the topic. Also, being aware 
that previous researches have seldom addressed the reactions of “receivers” – 
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Chinese students – to the history narratives of the “creator” – patriotic education in 
schools,15 this study attempts to examine the characteristics of the Chinsee patriotic 
curriculum and empirically survey Chinese students’ reception and “digestions” of 
the patriotic curricula in schools. This empirical study, therefore, consists of two 
parts: analysis on Chinese patriotic history curriculum and survey on students’ 
reactions to the curriculum.  
The whole process of the empirical examinations generally involves two stages: 
data collection and data analyses. While site visits, in-depth interviews and 
questionnaire surveys are carried out to collect data, both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis are adopted for data analyses.  
 
1.5.1 Data collection  
I. Field Research and In-depth Interviews 
The process of data collection began with a fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing 
where famous patriotic education bases concerning Japan’s invasion in modern 
China,
16
 and the biggest state-owned press for publishing textbooks—the People’s 
Education Press—are located.   
During the fieldtrip, site visits to several important patriotic education bases 
were conducted, with notes and photos taken of the museum exhibitions as well as 
visitors’ comments.17 Visits were also paid to the library of the People’s Education 
                                                             
 
15
 There have been both theoretical and empirical researches on Chinese patriotic education and its 
impacts on students. However, few of them have empirically examined students’ reactions to the 
patriotic education. As Kazuya Fukuoka (2011) suggested, emphasizing creators of history narratives 
(and their production), the field tends to overlook the audience, or, receivers in the process. 
Fairbrother (2002)’s empirical work on secondary school and college student’s reactions to the civic 
education in Hong Kong and patriotic education in Mainland education is one of the few. By 
examining the textbooks of the civic classes at the primary level in both China and Japan, Caroline 
Rose (2010) also made a contribution to the existing empirical works in the field, but she also pointed 
out the importance to analyze students’ “digestion” of the curriculum in the end of her paper.       
16
 The “Outline for Implementing the Patriotic Education” (1994) required local governments of all 
levels to use different sorts of museums, memorial halls, buildings in memory of martyrs, sites of 
important battles in revolutionary wars, protected historic relics, and scenic sites for conducting 
patriotic education. In March 1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that 100 sites were selected 
as the national level “patriotic education bases.” For more details about the 100 patriotic education 
bases, see Wang (2008). 
17
 The patriotic education bases visited include the Museum of the War of Chinese People` s 
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Memorial Sculpture Garden of the War of Chinese 
People` s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing as well as 
the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders in Nanjing. Visitors’ 
comments are voluntarily and freely left by the visitors when they are having and finish their visits to 
the museums. These comments could be visitors’ feelings towards the themes of the museums and 
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Press in order to examine different editions of history textbooks in secondary schools 
and have in-depth interviews with two history textbooks designers. To inquire about 
the nature of Chinese nationalism/patriotism and the impacts of Chinese history 
education on Sino-Japanese relations, in-depth interviews were also administered 
with another 2 historians in Chinese modern and contemporary history and 6 
specialists in both Chinese patriotic education and Sino-Japanese relations.
18
 
For those in-depth interviews with textbook designers, historians and specialists, 
the construction of a semi-structured interview schedule was designed beforehand, 
guided by the existing literature on Chinese history education, Chinese 
nationalism/patriotism and their impacts on Sino-Japanese relations. Due to the 
expertise of different interviewees, different questions related to different aspects 
were asked. Those questions, however, all pointed to the research topic and can be 
initially grouped into the following aspects: 1) the nature of Chinese 
nationalism/patriotism; 2) the design of history and patriotic curriculum in secondary 
schools and its impacts on students’ views of foreign countries; 3) Chinese 
(especially Chinese youths) perceptions of Japan and the impacts of Chinese 
nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations. 
Exploratory interviews were also conducted with history teachers and students 
from secondary schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.
19
 In these interviews with history 
teachers, I talked to them individually either online or in face-to-face manner.
20
 With 
a semi-structured schedule in hand, my talk with the history teachers in general 
focused on the following two questions: 1) what and how do they actually teach 
students about Japan in and out of history classes with the patriotic education 
curriculum？2) how do they evaluate the impacts of the patriotic history curriculum 
on students and students images of Japan?  
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
their advice for the improvements of the museums.  
18
 Those historians and specialists interviewed currently teach and work in the top universities and 
research institute in Beijing and Nanjing. Interviews were taped with the consent of the interviewees, 
with anonymity assured. 
19
 Since Shenzhen is a new city without historical events concerning Japan’s invasions in modern 
China while Nanjing did experience dominant ones, it is reasonable to assume it is more likely for 
these two cities to have different approaches to history and patriotic education, particularly regarding 
to Japan. Thus, 4 teachers and 10 students in total were conveniently selected from two secondary 
schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.  
20
 Interviews with the teachers from Shenzhen were conducted in face-to-face manner while 
interviews with the teachers from Nanjing were conducted online.  
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To see students’ reflections on the patriotic history curriculum in schools and as 
parts of the pretests for the questionnaire survey in the later stage, students were 
interviewed with a structured schedule (See Appendix I), in which open-ended 
questions were carefully designed and students were asked to answer the open-ended 
questions one by one without time constraint.
21
 The structured interview schedule 
mainly covered the following three aspects: 1) what do students know about Japan? 2) 
through what means do students receive information about Japan? and 3) how do 
students view Japan as well as the patriotic history education in their schools? 
With both semi-structured and structured interviews, specific information and 
tentative insights into how Chinese patriotic history education is implemented in 
schools and how students “digest” the education were provided by the history 
teachers and students interviewed. However, given the small number of teachers and 
students who could feasibly be interviewed, it would be difficult to gauge differences 
and similarities in the ways teachers teach students about Japan in schools and 
students’ reflections to the education. It is also acknowledged that the interviews 
(especially those with historians, specialists and textbook designers) would suffer 
from the following limitations. First, it would be difficult (and understandable) for all 
the interviewees, who are Chinese, to be truly value-free and interpret Chinese 
patriotism objectively, even though they are all well-educated and are experts in their 
fields. Second, due to the political sensitivity of the topic, there may still be a certain 
political “propaganda” element in the response (especially those of interviewees who 
actually participate in designing the patriotic education curriculum).    
 
II. Questionnaire Survey  
To address the limitations of in-depth interviews and to have a more faithful and 
genuine picture of Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan, a detailed questionnaire 
survey was administered to 643 secondary schools students in 8 mainland cities 
where large-scale anti-Japanese protests have taken place both in1996 and 2005.
22 
 
                                                             
 
21
 All the students from both Nanjing and Shenzhen were interviewed with the same structured 
schedule. While interviews with students from Shenzhen were conducted in oral and face-to-face 
manner, interviews with students from Nanjing were also conducted online through email.. 
22
 The survey was carried out in 9 mainland cities – Shenyang, Xi’an, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing and Shenzhen – at the very beginning. As the sample of Xi’an was 
withdrawn from the total sample due to a possible invalid and unreliable dataset from a preliminary 
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With extensive reference to the published public opinion polls administered 
nationwide in mainland China by both Chinese and Japanese organizations, most of 
the questions and items in the questionnaire were firstly drawn from the previously 
published polls.
23
 To make the questionnaire best fit within the context of our 
research objects, however, certain questions and scale items were revised based on 
the information gathered from the earlier exploratory interviews with textbook 
designers, scholars and teachers as well as students.  
To further enhance the construct validity of the questionnaires, efforts were also 
tried to obtain the evaluations of the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of 
the questionnaire from 4 professors, each of whom is both interested in the research 
topic and has expertise in Chinese patriotic education, Sino-Japanese relations, 
political socialization or survey research. Moreover, advice from teachers and 
students in secondary schools was sought to further develop the questionnaire so that 
the questionnaire could have better measurements and be fully understood by the 
respondents -- secondary school students.    
In terms of the content, the questionnaire generally addresses the following 
concerns: 1) what and through what means do students know about Japan? 2) what 
do students learn about Japan through the history and patriotic education curricula in 
schools? 3) how do students view Japan and “digest” the history and patriotic 
curricula in schools? 4) what impacts do the history and patriotic curricula in schools 
have on students’ perceptions of Japan?     
The questionnaire was originally written in Chinese and later translated into 
English with the help and evaluation of an English native speaker, a Hong Kong 
Chinese, a mainland Chinese as well as a Singaporean who speaks very good 
Mandarin. For both English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire, see Appendix 
II and III.  
Given pilot tests administered in small-scale samples from Shenzhen, Wuhan 
and Nanjing in earlier stages,
24 
the final version of the questionnaire with 18 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
analysis, the survey data of the other 8 cities was analyzed. 
23
 These public opinion polls include 4 polls conducted by the Japanese Studies Institute of CASS in 
every two years since 2002, and annual surveys jointly conducted by China Daily and Genron NPO in 
Japan since 2005.    
24
 Before pilot tests, pre-tests were repeatedly administered with secondary schools students in 
Shenzhen for better construction and distribution of the questionnaire. To group representativeness, 
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closed-ended questions was refined and distributed to students of different grades 
and classes by their teachers in different cities during June 1
st
 -10
th
 , 2011.
25
 
Students were sampled from one or two public secondary schools conveniently 
accessed in each city,
26
 ranging from the first year students in junior high schools to 
the third year students in senior high schools. Fifteen students were selected from 
each of the six grades, making a sub-sample of 90 for each city and a total sample of 
720 for 8 cities. With a response rate of 89.3%,
27 
643 valid cases with complete 
responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are cases from Beijing, 73 from 
Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from 
Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72 from Wuhan. 
 
1.5.2 Data analyses  
I. Qualitative Analysis  
Through the previous fieldwork, textbooks material, teaching guidelines, 
official documents, transcripts of interviews as well as museums visitors’ comments 
were collected. Qualitative approaches, such as content analysis and the methods of 
summary and induction then were used to analyze these archival data at hand.  
For textbook materials, teaching guidelines, official documents and museum 
visitors’ comments, content analyses were mainly conducted. At first, relevant textual 
data of these materials were selected, condensed and classified into different groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
pilot tests were finally administered to 60 students from Shenzhen, Wuhan and Nanjing, each of which 
had 20 students conveniently sampled.  
25
 Students ranging from the first year in junior high schools to the second year of senior high schools 
were asked to complete the questionnaires within 15 minutes in classes and directly returned the 
questionnaires to the teachers. However, since the third year students in senior high schools are taking or 
have taken the College Entrance Examinations when the survey was conducted, and could not be 
regularly accessed in the classes, the questionnaires had to be distributed to them individually through 
mailings and be returned with return envelopes.   
26
 In Mainland China, there are different types of secondary schools. According to the figures from the 
Ministry of Education, however, nearly 90% of the secondary schools are public schools in 2010. 
Though all secondary schools in China are more or less required to follow a patriotic education 
curriculum, public secondary schools are generally believed to provide the strongest patriotic education. 
Thus, to examine the impacts of official patriotic education, we had our samples taken from public 
schools rather than from other types of schools. Among the 8 cities under observation, students in 
Beijing, Wuhan and Chongqing were from two different public secondary schools since schools 
selected were either junior high schools or senior high schools, while students from Shenyang, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Changsha and Shenzhen came from the same secondary schools with both junior and senior 
high classes. Following the principle of anonymity, the names of these schools are not revealed here. 
27
 The response rate was obtained with the exclusion of the Xi’an’s sample. Of 720 questionnaires 
distributed in the examined cities, 48 were not returned, and 29 were discounted for their partial 
completion. 
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Subject to our research questions, these textual data were then coded and in turn used 
together with statistical data in an attempt to understand salient themes and test 
relevant suggested assumptions.  
For transcripts of the interviews, however, data were analyzed inductively. 
Detailed transcripts of interviews were firstly summarized. They were then 
categorized into the three aspects which the interviews were intended to address. In 
this way, instead of detailed transcript being cited, opinions from different interviews 
were summed up with corresponding themes and used to answer the questions 
addressed in Chapter III and IV.  
 
II. Quantitative Analysis  
Closed-ended questionnaire survey makes it possible to carry out quantitative 
statistical analyses with the data. It also makes it possible to compare research 
subjects by different variables and examine relationships between variables. For the 
research purpose of this study, descriptive analyses and the statistical procedures of 
comparing means, such as independent samples t-tests and ANOVA, through SPSS 
computer software, were mainly used. Moreover, to examine relationships between 
certain variables, correlation analysis (Pearson’s correlation) was also employed.  
       
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
With this introductory chapter covering literature reviews, research questions, 
study scope, theoretical framework and research methods of the study, the next 
chapter provides a brief historical review of Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972 
as background information for further discussions. Based on both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis on the empirical data collected from the fieldworks and surveys, 
the study then comes to address the research questions on Chinese patriotic education 
after 1989 in chapter III and further discusses Chinese youths’ reactions to the 
patriotic curriculum in schools and their perceptions of Japan in chapter IV. In 
chapter V, this study comes back to answer the main research question and generally 
concludes the effects of patriotic education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan. 
To link the findings of this study with its social background, a further discussion on 
Chinese “confident nationalism” in current Chinese society is also provided in the 
conclusion, placing the study under the broader discussions on the evolving Chinese 
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nationalism and its impacts. In the end are elaborations of the contributions and 
limitations of the study as well as several practical suggestions for improving mutual 
perceptions and the bilateral relations between China and Japan. 
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Chapter 2 
Chinese Perceptions of Japan since 1972 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Being close neighbors in Asia, China and Japan had enjoyed good relations for a 
long time in ancient times. The long friendships were unfortunately interrupted by 
the brutal warfare between two countries in modern times, leaving much historical 
legacy to the bilateral relations in the postwar and current days. After the World War 
II, due to the Cold War structural constraints and Japan’s official recognition of 
Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations did not come until the 1970s when China 
split with the Soviet Union and the U.S. subsequently sought Sino-American 
rapprochement for Chinese assistance to end the Vietnam War and to facilitate the 
broader goal of balancing Soviet power. To inquire into the impacts of Chinese 
patriotic education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan since 1989, however, this 
study mainly focuses on the Sino-Japanese relations after the normalization in 1972. 
For further discussions in the later chapters, this chapter attempts to have a general 
review of the bilateral relations since 1972 and particularly outline a picture of the 
evolving Chinese perceptions of Japan in the past 40 years.  
 
2.2 The “honeymoon” period: mutual perceptions improved in 1970s 
Faced with the common Soviet threat in the later stages of the Cold War, soon 
after the “Nixon Shock”,28 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka paid an official 
visit to Beijing to seal the Sino-Japanese normalization with his Chinese counterparts 
on 25 September 1972. While China aimed at strengthening its anti-Soviet front 
through the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, Japan attempted to gain a certain 
diplomatic autonomy by normalizing relations with Beijing before the Sino-U.S. 
rapprochements (Chalmers 1986: 403; He 2009: 186). Motivated by these pragmatic 
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 In February 1972, the U.S. President Richard Nixon surprisingly paid a visit to China and signed 
the Shanghai Communiqué with China. This unexpected gesture caused shock outside China and the 
U.S., including for the Japanese government and people (Feng, Gao and Wang 2007: 310-311).      
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objectives, China and Japan thus joined efforts to build up a mutually beneficial 
relationship between two nations in 1970s, directly and indirectly promoting friendly 
relations between two peoples as well.      
In a 1969 survey in Japan, China was rated as the second largest security threat 
to Japan (15.6%) after the USSR (20.4%).
29 
A survey in April 1972, however, 
showed that the percentage of Japanese people who saw China as the most 
threatening country dropped to 9%, which fell far behind those who felt the same 
way about the USSR (34.3%) and even the U.S. (16.6%).
30
 On China’s side, without 
public opinion polls about Sino-Japanese relations being conducted in 1970s, it was 
nonetheless known that China’s previous travel restrictions with Japan were scrapped 
and personnel exchanges between two sides increased rapidly soon after the 
Sino-Japanese normalization. Regular exchanges of commercial flights between 
Tokyo and Beijing began in September 1974 and by November 1981, friendly 
exchange relations had been established between 33 pairs of “sister cities”.31  
With these good postures between two governments and the goodwill of senior 
officials in both sides to develop friendships between two countries, the mutual 
perceptions of Chinese and Japanese people were obviously improved after the 
normalization, even though most of the Chinese who had suffered from the wars still 
kept in mind the traumatic past while most of Japanese took China as a backward 
country in need of Japan’s help. In China, for instance, following the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Japan, positive images of contemporary Japan, though 
co-existing with negative media treatment of past Sino-Japanese conflicts, portrayed 
Japan as a role model that should be emulated in selective ways (Whiting 1989: 80). 
Favorable depictions of all walks of the life in Japan, which covered education, 
technology, economic and even Japanese daily life, were found in both Chinese 
scholarly works and official newspaper, such as Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth 
Daily) and Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). These descriptions of Japanese 
                                                             
 
29
 Yomiuri Shimbun survey on public perceptions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, June 1969, in Public 
Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat of Japanese Prime Minster, Seron Chosa Nenkan, 1970, 492, 
quoted from He (2009: 201)  
30
 National survey on Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. and China and approval rates of cabinet and 
political parties by the Japan Association for Public Opinion, April 1972, in Ibid, 1973, 395, quoted 
from He (2009: 201)    
31
 The China-Japan Friendship Association, “Table on Friendly Cities between China and Japan 
(Chronologically)”, see http://www.zryx.org.cn/AssociateCityList.aspx?toSort=0, accessed on April 
25, 2012.    
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contemporary society and its postwar evolution, while facilitating the leaderships’ 
efforts to promote good relations between two countries, countered the war memories 
in Chinese minds and gradually built up Chinese new images of Japan and Japanese 
contemporary society in this “honeymoon period” in 1970s.                 
 
2.3 Tensions come back: wartime memories stirred up in 1980s.   
The amicable atmosphere between China and Japan during 1970s did not 
continue into the 1980s even though China and Japan still shared a common strategic 
interest to balance the Soviet threat in this period. Washington’s continued military 
commitment to Taiwan in late 1970s, which was displayed through arms sales to 
Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act (enacted in April 1979), also distanced Beijing 
from Washington. Beijing formally endorsed its so-called independent foreign policy 
at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and shortly afterward resumed 
normalization talks with Moscow (He 2009:207). Japan, by the beginning of the 
1980s, had become an economic giant. It then sought to promote international 
political influence to commensurate with its economic power. As both the 
international and domestic environments changed, tensions between China and Japan 
came back and demolished the friendly relationships which were built up in the 
1970s.   
Under the three principles (Peaceful and Friendly, Equal and Mutually 
Beneficial, Long-term and Stable) for the bilateral relations proposed by Premier 
Zhao Ziyang in June 1982 when he visited Japan,
32
 and with Japan’s extension of 
generous yen loans to China, Sino-Japanese diplomacy still remained an upbeat tone 
at the beginning of the 1980s (He 2009: 232). However, starting with the disputes 
over Japanese history textbooks in 1982, Sino-Japanese relationship turned to a 
downturn due to frequent inter-governmental disputes and the simmering mutual 
antipathy at the popular level from the mid-1980s.  
The textbook disputes in 1982 had caused such a lengthy and bitter coverage of 
the campaign in the mass media from both sides, stirring up China’s memories of the 
wartime past and aroused contemporary Chinese youths over possible Japanese 
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 This was developed into “four principles” by adding “mutually trust” in November 1983 when Hu 
Yaobang visited Japan. See: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/8212/30794/30796/2230761.html, 
accessed in April 25, 2012.    
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militarist behavior in the future (Whiting 1989: 28). The commemoration of the 
fortieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1985 also brought vividly communicated 
accounts of wartime suffering to the younger generation in China. Dramatic evidence 
of the impacts of these issues came in September in 1985 when thousands of 
university students in Beijing and elsewhere publicly demonstrated against Japanese 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honored the 
memory of Japanese war dead including 14 class-A war criminals, on the anniversary 
day of the 1931 Manchurian Incident (Whiting 1989: 28).  
The theme of wartime recall reemerged in 1986 during the second textbook 
dispute. Although this dispute ended without the rancor of the first dispute and 
without too much attention from media, public objections still remained on the 
Chinese side (Whiting 1989: 20-21). Despite little media attention, many Chinese 
individuals showed a keen knowledge of the details and expressed considerable 
emotion in criticizing the Japanese handling of the matter. Although the 1986 
controversy was diplomatically settled down with the compromise from both sides, 
this repeated dispute further educated Chinese, especially the Chinese younger 
generations who have not personal experiences of the wars, about the past wartime 
history and worsened their images of Japan.  
Almost at the same time of the history textbook disputes, in both 1986 and 1987, 
the Osaka High Court twice recognized Taiwan’s ownership of a student dormitory in 
Kyoto called the Guanghua Hostel (Kokaryo in Japanese), which was purchased by 
the KMT regime in Taiwan in 1952. This dormitory dispute unavoidably increased 
attention over Taiwan from both the Chinese government and its people. It not only 
reminded Chinese people of the history that Taiwan was taken by Japan in 1895, but 
also further triggered Chinese worry over Japanese reviving militarism. It thus again 
resulted in another clash of Chinese and Japanese nationalism as well as another 
bitter war of words between Beijing and Tokyo regarding the legitimacy of the 
Taiwan regime (Howe, ed 1996: 74-76). 
Coming to the late 1980s, as an accumulative result of the previous disputes, 
Chinese government turned to criticize the strengthening of Japan’s military 
capabilities, questioning Japanese government’s decision to break the 1 percent GNP 
ceiling for annual defense spending in 1987 and directly remarking its worry over the 
revival of Japanese militarism. Due to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Japan joined 
  
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
the other Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations in isolating China in both 
political and economic ways. China and Japan thus suspended the bilateral summits 
by the end of the 1980s and the friendly relations soon cooled off (Whiting and Xin 
1990: 108).  
The bilateral disputes and frictions in the 1980s may have soon died down, but 
they eventually led to public frustration between two sides in this period. The 
anti-Japanese student protests across China began with the historical disputes in this 
period. As a reaction, Japanese people started feeling “annoyed” and resentful with 
the Chinese “playing the history card.” Under an “action-reaction syndrome”, as 
argued by Allen Whiting (1989: 196), popular nationalism and estrangement turned 
stronger between the two countries during this period and continued rising since 
then.  
 
2.4 “Economically hot, politically cold”: popular relations frozen in mid-1990s 
and early 2000s.   
Although downgraded from the previous rapprochement to frictions within the 
stage of shallow reconciliation in 1980s, the general atmosphere of Sino-Japanese 
relations did not turn decisively negative (He 2009: 232). The China-Japan joint polls 
held in 1988 showed that 50.6% of Chinese respondents and 64.4% percent of 
Japanese respondents still thought the current bilateral relationship was “very good” 
or “good” (Jiang 1989: 23). As a matter of fact, as suggested by Whiting 
(1989:80-92), Chinese perceptions of Japan were dual images of an “economic role 
model” and a “ruthless aggressor” in the 1980s.  The Sino-Japanese relationships 
therefore did not see actually downward spiral until the mid-1990s.  
Coming to the 1990s, the common basis of the strategic interests for China and 
Japan in defending themselves from the “Soviet Threat” disappeared with the end of 
the Cold War in the early 1990s. The U.S. then began to adjust its China policy from 
“alliance” to one of seeing a major ideological enemy and a potential geo-political 
rival in the West Pacific zone (Jin 2001: 104). Faced with these international changes 
in post-Cold-War era, China and Japan had to re-define their bilateral relationship 
(Manicom and O'Neil 2009: 217). Sino-Japanese relations thus met uncertainty and 
volatilities during this post-Cold-War era.  
Although Japan joined the G-7 in isolating China after the Tiananmen Incident 
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in 1989, Japan soon restarted its ODA to China in July 1990, being the first country 
of the G-7 to stop isolating China. With the frequent inter-governmental visits 
between two countries in the next two years, including Japanese Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu’s official visit to China in 1991, the General Secretary of CCP Jiang 
Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1992 and the well-received visit to China by the Japanese 
Emperor and Empress in 1992, Sino-Japanese relations enjoyed temporary serenity 
in the early 1990s.  
However, Sino-Japanese relations started the downturn of both governmental 
and popular relations from the mid-1990s (He 2009: 234). The downturn of the 
bilateral relations was precipitated by the controversy over whether a Taiwan official, 
Hsu Li-teh, should be allowed to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games in 
Hiroshima in 1994 and the exchanges over Chinese nuclear testing in 1995. 
Following disagreements were over Japanese right-wingers’ repeated attempts to 
land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1996 and Japanese PM Ryutaro Hashimoto’s 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine in the same year. Bilateral frictions even continued during 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s formal visit to Tokyo in November 1998, in which 
he harshly criticized Japan’s wartime history and demanded Japanese contrition. All 
these frictions in the mid-1990s consequently led Sino-Japanese relations to the 
worst point since 1972 (Jin 2001: 106).  
In February 1997 when Zhongguo qingnianbao reported on its 1996 survey of 
100 000 Chinese young people, it asserted that just 15% of them had good feelings 
toward Japan and 14% thought Sino-Japanese relations were good. A 1997 follow-up, 
however, found that only 10% like Japan and 34% dislike it (quoted from Rozman 
(2002), Amako 1998: 24).   
Alarmed by the downturn in public opinion, leaders in both sides had tried some 
efforts to stabilize the bilateral relations. Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, for 
example, resulted in a joint declaration as the third document between China and 
Japan, in which the two governments reached an agreement for building a 
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Developments (Jin 2001: 
108). However, due to Jiang’s insistence on mentioning the historical issues during 
his visit, Jiang’s visit to Japan unfortunately did not improve the bilateral relations. 
Instead, it aroused the disputes over wartime history and quarrel over the issue of 
“apology” between two countries, further worsening Chinese negative opinions 
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towards Japan, and even resulting in Japanese people’s reactive protests against Jiang 
personally and China as a whole (Rozman 2002: 111). Since then, the dispute over 
“apology” has remained a problem in the background of Sino-Japanese relations and 
from time to time was brought to the forefront.    
Being aware of the importance of Sino-Japanese relations, to reassure Japanese 
people and calm their own public, Chinese government later announced its “smile 
diplomacy” to Japan in the fall of 1999 (Rozman 2002: 113). The visibility of 
Chinese government’s efforts was Jiang Zemin’s meeting with Japanese travelers on 
20 May 1999 and Zhu Rongji’s “friendship tour” to Japan from 12 to 17 October 
1999. However, Chinese government’s “smile diplomacy” did not work out among 
its public. Chinese Internet posts defied the official goals, criticizing Zhu for his 
message that present-day Japanese should not bear responsibility for the militarism 
and war against China, and furthermore that China highly appreciated Japan’s ODA 
(Quoted from Rozman (2002: 113), Watanabe 2001: 126). Zhu was even called a 
traitor by millions of educated young Chinese on the Internet for his assertion to 
Japanese reporters that China does not want to hurt Japanese feelings over historical 
matters.33   
Coming to the 21
st
 century, disputes over history, territory and sovereignty 
continually popped up one after another. Starting with the textbook disputes in late 
2000 and early 2001, Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi’s insistence on annual worship 
at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 consistently broke the bilateral relations. In addition, 
provoked by the bawdy show of four Japanese who taught and studied at the 
Northwest University in China, massive numbers of Chinese university students 
demonstrated in the streets in Xi’an in 2003.34 Following in 2004 were ongoing 
disputes over economic rights in the East China Sea, riots in Beijing after Japan beat 
China in the Asia Cup football finals, and the intrusion into Japanese territorial 
waters of a Chinese nuclear attack submarine, as well as the Japanese identification 
of China as “a concern” alongside North Korea in the national defense program 
guidelines. In 2005, moreover, upon Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United 
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 Mainichi Shimbun, November 2, 2000. 
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 In October 2003, a Japanese teacher and three Japanese students presented a bawdy show, which 
was taken to insult China, in an formal and serious ceremony, triggering massive protests of numerous 
Chinese students from different universities in Xi’an.     
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Nations Security Council, a collection of 44 million signatures for a Chinese petition 
was alleged in early 2005. In February, Japan and the US released a joint statement, 
which was a continuation of the “New Directives for US-Japan Joint Defense” in 
1996 and 1997 and included the security of Taiwan into the alliance’s “common 
strategic objectives.” The joint-statement not only raised “grave concern” and strong 
objections from Beijing, but also annoyed the Chinese populace and further aroused 
Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments. Being the last straw, the Japanese Education 
Ministry’s approval of a controversial history textbook in April 2005 finally 
provoked mass demonstrations against Japan across the Mainland. The nationwide 
demonstrations kept growing and lasted long during the last week of March and the 
first few weeks of April in 2005 (Hagström 2008-2009: 225).  
Strangely, while political and popular relations between China and Japan 
deteriorated since the mid-1990s, the economic ties between two countries somehow 
grew rapidly and were becoming “hot”. During 1994-2003, Japan had been China’s 
largest trading partner while China had been Japan’ s second partner since 1993 and 
surpassed the U.S. to become Japan’s largest trading partner in 2005 (Wan 2006: 
223). According to Chinese figures, the value of the mutual trade between China and 
Japan had grown from $12 billion in 1990 to $83 billion in 2000 when it accounted 
for more than 22% of China's total trade. Paralleling this had been a corresponding 
growth in Japanese FDI in China. Following their caution in the 1980s Japanese 
companies had rapidly increased their investment in China in the 1990s.Japanese 
FDI in 1991 came to $579 million and in 1998 it reached $3.2 billion. By the late 
1999s, there had been 18,140 Japanese direct investment projects in China and China 
had ranked second only to the US as a target for Japanese investment.35 
 Despite the “hot” economic interactions between two countries in general level, 
with poor governmental and popular relations, frequent frictions in different business 
sectors to some extent also worsened the bilateral relations. In 1985, for example, 
while the student demonstrations in fall seemed provoked by Nakasone’s visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine in August, they actually attacked Japan’s “economic invasion” as 
well (Whiting 1989: 95). In 2001, the dispute over what the Chinese called 
                                                             
 
35
 The figures were drawn from the web site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/478.html). See Yahuda (2006).   
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“discrimination by Japanese firms”36 also caused Chinese negative images of Japan 
and added to cause the outburst of the massive anti-Japanese protests across China in 
2005.  
 
2.5 Thawing the ice but tensions remain: popular relations warming up with 
uncertainty since 2006    
When Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, this marked a new phase of 
Sino-Japanese relations since it ended the “frozen” bilateral relations that existed 
under the leadership of Koizumi (Jiang 2007: 15). To improve the “frozen” state of 
the bilateral relation, the new Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, decided to make 
his first foreign trip to China (instead of the U.S.) in October 2006, attempting to 
break the ice on the bilateral summit that had been suspended for the past five years 
and warm up the “cold” political ties between China and Japan. In response, Chinese 
premier Wen Jiabao paid an “ice-melting” visit to Japan in April 2007, followed by 
the next Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda’s “spring-welcoming” trip to China in 
December 2007. To push the bilateral relations into a further stage, Chinese president 
Hu Jintao also paid his “warm spring” visit to Japan in May 2008, leading 
Sino-Japanese relations back to the peak of amicability in 1970s (He 2009: 288; 
Jiang 2007: 18).   
With these friendly official gestures and the positive rhetoric of “ice breaking,” 
“ice melting,” “spring-welcoming,” and “warm spring,” the popular relations 
between two peoples were warming up as well. According to the annual surveys 
jointly launched by both sides since 2006, a favorable opinion of Japan among 
Chinese had uninterrupted risen from 11.6% in 2006 to 38.3% in 2010.37  
Despite of the bilateral relations being warming up at both governmental and 
popular levels, none of the bilateral disputes has been actually settled, but only been 
shelved. Given the fact, tensions thus remain in current Sino-Japanese relations. 
Bilateral tensions always come back when any of these shelved disputes popped up. 
In March 2007, for instance, the “comfort women” issue, which was re-politicized 
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 Mainly referring to Chinese outcries over two issues in 2001: 1) Japan Airlines and All Nippon 
Airlines forced Chinese passengers to spend the night in Japanese airports while treating other 
passengers differently; 2) Mitsubishi Motors recalled cars in the United States but refused to recall 
similar models in China. See Rozman (2002: 121).     
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 China Daily, August 19-25, 2011.  
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after then-Prime Minister Abe’s denial of the Japanese military’s involvement in 
forcing women into sexual slavery during the World War II, has raised up certain 
levels of tensions between two sides. Similarly, the disputes over wartime history 
came up this year again. The Nagoya Mayor publicly denied the Nanjing Massacre 
when he met his Chinese counterparts from Nanjing in February 2012, resulting in 
tremendous online protests by Chinese internet users and the official objections from 
Chinese government.  
Coming to the latest days, Sino-Japanese relations have been more often 
troubled by the territorial disputes, which tend to be more serious and more 
troublesome since territory is both politically and economically important and both 
sides tend to hold assertive stands on the issues. The competition over the Chunxiao 
gas field (Shirakaba in Japanese) since 2008 has been an important issue between 
China and Japan and from time to time attracts great attentions from both the public 
and mass media in two sides. Contingent incidents over disputed waters, like the 
fishing boat collisions in late 2010, had also caused mass protests in both sides and 
eventually affected the bilateral economic exchanges. The ongoing controversies 
over “buying” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in most recent days, for instance, have 
doubtlessly caused certain tension between two governments, inevitably worsening 
the mutual perceptions between two peoples.  
According to the latest survey results published in June 20, 2012 by both 
China Daily and Genron NPO, it was indicated that 58.4 % of Chinese respondents 
believed territorial issues are a primary cause of the problems hampering the 
development of Sino-Japanese relations, followed by 30% of Chinese respondents 
taking a lack of mutual trust as a primary cause for poor relations.38 The results of 
the same survey in 2011 similarly suggested the recent territorial disputes have been 
an bigger factor affecting the bilateral relations. Actually, Chinese favorable attitudes 
towards Japan have dropped from 38.3% in 2010 to 28.6% in 2011, reversing the 
uninterrupted rising number in the previous four years since 2006.39   
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2.6 Conclusion  
The year of 2012 marks the 40
th
 anniversary of the Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement. With almost two generations’ efforts in the past 40 years, 
Sino-Japanese relations in general have been improved at least in political and 
economical sectors even though tensions still remain.40
 
Given both regional and 
worldwide challenges under the globalization and with deeper economic 
interdependence, both Chinese and Japanese governments have shown their goodwill 
to sustain and improve the bilateral relations. Sino-Japanese relations thus currently 
keep manageable with normal political interactions and frequent economical 
exchanges between two sides.  
The bilateral relations between Chinese and Japanese peoples, however, seem 
more complicated. As Whiting (1989:126) concluded, mutual perceptions between 
peoples do not always accord with actual circumstances, especially when they are 
embedded in a relationship plagued by historical and emotional tensions. Therefore, 
despite the friendly official gestures of two governments and the interdependent 
economic ties between two countries, it is to some extent true that the popular 
relations between two peoples so far remain at the stage of shallow reconciliation 
without genuine mutual trust and institutionalized interactions. As Wan (2006: 2) 
described, Sino-Japanese relations up to now still remain dispute-prone, cyclical and 
distant psychologically at popular level.  
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 As the latest survey suggested, despite the drop of Chinese favorable attitudes towards Japan in 
2011, this figure have increased (to 35.4%) again this year. See Genron NPO, June 20, 2012, 
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Chapter 3 
Chinese Patriotic Education Since 1989 
 
3.1 Introduction  
With a brief historical review of the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations and 
Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972 provided in the previous chapter, this 
chapter comes to address the two research questions on Chinese patriotic education: 
1) what is Chinese patriotic education since 1989 about? 2) what information about 
Japan does the post-1989 patriotic education intend to teach Chinese youths? By 
using comparative and content analysis on the official documents on patriotic 
education and the history of Japan in the history curriculum in secondary schools 
before and after 1989, this chapter at first tries to examine whether or not the 
patriotic education itself at the official level has been purposely infused with modern 
China’s “humiliated history” in general and an anti-Japanese context in particular. 
Secondly, by using an analysis of the new history curriculum since 2001 along with 
interviews that I conducted with history textbook designers from the People’s 
Education Press in PRC and history teachers from secondary schools in Nanjing and 
Shenzhen, this chapter further analyzes how patriotic education is actually 
implemented in schools and what information about Japan and Sino-Japanese 
relations are actually taught under the current reformed history curriculum.  
 
3.2 The “Patriotic Education Campaign” since 1989    
During the post-Mao reform in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy, China for the first time tried to set up a 
market – oriented economy system and “fully” opened its “national door” [guomen] 
to the outside world. This left Chinese people with much more freedom to be 
exposed to liberal and democratic ideas. Also, during the post-Mao reform period, 
Deng’s efforts to “reassess” Maoism so as to eradicate all ideological and 
psychological obstacles to economic reform unexpectedly resulted in the demise of 
the official ideology (Zhao 1998: 288). With more influences from the outside world 
on the one hand and the demise of the official communist ideology on the other, it 
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has been then argued by many scholars that the large-scale anti-government 
demonstrations in the spring of 1989 were a result of the bankruptcy of the 
communist official ideology. In accordance with these arguments, the CCP regime 
had tried almost all ways to step up its state-led political education and had thereby 
launched a “patriotic education campaign” in all sectors of Chinese society, 
especially in schools, in the face of perceived challenges to its authority (Gries 2004; 
Whiting 1995; Zhao 1998, 2004; Zheng 1999).   
To some extent, it is true that the biggest lesson the Chinese leadership learned 
from the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was the ineffectiveness of its political and 
ideological education in the 1980s. As Deng concluded after the Incident, 
“During the past ten years (the post-Mao reform period), the biggest mistakes 
had been made in the sector of education. By ‘education’, I referred to the 
ideological and political education (sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu).” 41 
The pro-democracy movements, which were mainly organized and joined by 
students in 1989, somehow did teach the CCP leadership an important lesson in that 
they had to some extent failed in their ideological-political education, particularly in 
fostering students’ belief in communist ideology and the legitimacy of CCP authority. 
Ironically, as Zhao (1998:289) put it, the pro-democracy demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square, while confronting the government, claimed that patriotism drove 
them to take to the streets. It thus seems that the previous efforts of the CCP in its 
ideological-political education did not totally fail but at least succeeded in teaching 
Chinese people to be patriotic. Inspired by this, as Zhao (1998: 289) further 
suggested, patriotism was re-discovered and pragmatically used by the CCP leaders 
to sustain the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority as well as the stability of Chinese 
society.   
Following these ideas, it is argued that a “patriotic education campaign” was 
launched by Deng and his successor (Jiang Zemin) after the Tiananmen Incident in 
1989 with a number of official documents and regulations pertaining to patriotic 
education being released by both the CCP Central Committee (hereafter CCPCC) 
and the State Education Commission (which was replaced as the Ministry of 
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 Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Dengxiaoping Wenxuan 
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Education in 1998, and hereafter the MOE) since the early 1990s (Zhao 1998, 2004). 
In April 1990, as a starting point of the patriotic education in new era, the MOE 
issued “A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School 
Moral Education Work” [Guanyu Jinyubu Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de 
Jidian Yijian], calling on schools to emphasize moral education, particularly patriotic 
education, and offering detailed instructions on the content and implementation of 
the patriotic education (Zheng 2011: 77). Following up was a “Notice on Fully Using 
Culture Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions” 
[Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming Chuantong 
Jiaoyu de Tongzh], issued by CCPCC in August 1991. The “Campaign” was more 
evident after Deng’s southern China tour in early 1992. Soon after Deng’s Southern 
China Tour, in January 1993, the MOE enacted the “Program for China’s Education 
Reform and Development” [Zhongguo Jiaoyu Gaige yu Fazhan Jihua], laying out 
patriotism as a guiding principle for China’s educational reform (Zhao 1998: 292). 
One year later, in August 1994, the CCP Central Committee released a key official 
document – “Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [Aiguo Jiaoyu 
Shixing Gangyao], leading to a climax of the nationwide “patriotic education 
campaign” (He 2007: 57).  
By carrying out these official documents to all sectors of Chinese society, the 
CCP leaders have indeed tried to reform and strengthen the patriotic education in 
China since the early 1990s in order to sustain Chinese people’s love and support for 
the Chinese motherland and the CCP authority. However, it does not mean that 
Chinese government’s emphasis on patriotic education or political ideological 
education started after 1989 as well.  
As a matter of fact, soon after the post-Mao period of reform and openness 
began with the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party in 1978, China’s 
leaders had been aware of the perceived need for patriotic education in China. 
Therefore, both the CCPCC and the MOE had in fact issued certain official 
documents to strengthen the ideological and political education to deal with a 
number of perceived problems with Chinese society and citizens, such as “worship of 
foreign things,” “national nihilism,” and a lack of confidence in socialism in China, 
which were mainly caused by the past experience of the Cultural Revolution and the 
current openness to the outside world (Guo, eds. 1995: 602).The earliest document 
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on political education after the Cultural Revolution – “Ministry of Education Opinion 
on Improving and Strengthening Secondary School Political Education Courses”— 
for example, was released by the MOE in September 1980 (Guo, eds. 1995: 628). 
Three years later, in both July and August 1983, the CCPCC and the MOE 
successively released relevant documents on patriotic education in particular.42 A 
notice on improving and strengthening the teaching of history and geography courses 
in secondary school, for example, was also issued by the MOE in the same year so as 
to stimulate students’ national pride and patriotism.43  
Unfortunately, due to the problems existing with teachers, the content, and the 
teaching methods of moral education as well as the inadequate coordination between 
schools, society and families, the patriotic and moral education in schools before 
1989 was somehow not effective, and thus partially contributing to students’ 
large-scale anti-government movements in 1989 (Fairbrother 2002: 91; Zheng 
2011:77).  
Given the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which led to the perceived 
needs for patriotic education in the Chinese society, China’s leaders therefore called 
for a reform and strengthening of patriotic education in the whole Chinese society 
and launched such a so called “patriotic education campaign” after 1989 (Zhao 1998), 
or in Zheng’s (2011: 75) words, “Chinese patriotic education in the new era.”     
Chinese patriotic education since 1989, as prescribed in the 1994 Outline, was 
all-encompassing, with all actors throughout Chinese society called upon to 
contribute to the implementation of patriotic education. Schools, from the daycare 
level to the university level, were specifically called on to create a lively atmosphere 
of patriotism in which all courses were to be infused with patriotic education 
(Editorial Committee of CCPCC 1999: 925). As the major objects of school 
education, Chinese youths were taken as the focus of patriotic education, and were 
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 They are respectively “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda 
Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic 
Propaganda Education” [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu 
Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued on July 2, 1983 and 
“Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the ‘Opinion on Strengthening 
Patriotic Propaganda Education’”[Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi 
Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued on August 24, 1983.  
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 See “Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary 
School History and Geography Course” [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili 
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targeted by television, movies, music, dramas, arts, and stories which used rich and 
vivid imagery to provide patriotic education to young people (Editorial Committee of 
CCPCC 1999: 925-926). According to the 1994 Outline and relevant documents, 
museums, memorial halls, martyrs’ memorials, revolutionary war campaign and 
battle memorials, protected cultural and historical sites, important scenic spots, 
important development projects that demonstrate the nation’s achievements in 
developing material and spiritual civilization and so on should also be developed as 
patriotic education bases and allow school-organized teacher and student groups to 
visit free of charge.44 
The content of Chinese patriotic education stipulated in the 1994 outline was, as 
Zhao (1998: 296) put it, wide-ranging with two dominant themes: 1). Chinese 
tradition and history; 2) national unity and territorial integrity. Chinese students were 
expected to learn China’s traditional civilization, culture, customs, traditions, and 
philosophies as well as current national conditions and policies, including economic 
and political systems and policies, policy on reunification, nationalities policies, 
military affairs, foreign affairs, society, culture, population, and national resources 
(Fairbrother 2002: 95).  
The functions, or the goals of patriotic education, which were demonstrated in 
the 1994 Outline and also analyzed by Fairbrother (2002:93-94), mainly cover the 
following four aspects: 1) patriotic education contributes to the maintenance of 
territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride, responding to problems 
indicating a lack of respect for the nation among some Chinese citizens; 2) patriotic 
education is a vehicle for transmitting knowledge and appropriate attitudes about 
international relations; 3) patriotic education fulfills a function of maintaining the 
socialist system and state legitimacy, in response to the perceived appearance or 
influx of a variety of negative societal influences; 4) patriotic education performs a 
progressive function, encouraging contributions to China’s program of development 
and modernization. 
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 See “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State Education 
Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil Administration, Communist Youth League 
Central Committee, and National Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics 
in the Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary Traditions” [Zhonggong 
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, patriotism, in Chinese, aiguozhuyi, 
literally means “loving the state”. In China, “love for the state” is certainly equated 
with love for the People’s Republic of China, and as such is indistinguishable from 
love for socialism and love for the Communist Party (Fairbrother 2002: 96). In the 
PRC official discourse, patriotism in China is differentiated from nationalism and 
simply used under the context of a love for the socialist state and the Communist 
Party. In the period of reform and openness, it is particularly pointed out that in the 
post-1989 patriotic education curriculum, patriotism cannot be equated with “narrow 
nationalism.” Instead, as Fairbother (2002) further illustrated based on his 
understanding of the 19 official documents pertaining to Chinese patriotic education 
which he has examined,   
“While fostering China’s superior achievements and supporting her own 
interests, [Chinese]modern patriotism allows for the study and absorption of 
advanced culture from the world’s nations, including capitalist nations. This is 
patriotic because it allows for China’s further progress and development. Regarding 
knowledge and appropriate attitudes to hold about foreign nations and the world 
system, the basic message to be conveyed to students is that China upholds world 
peace. Students are to learn of China’s support for the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, policy of peaceful diplomatic relations, and support for friendly, 
cooperative relations with the people of other nations”(p.96).  
 
3.3 An official emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China in 
the post -1989 patriotic education     
Following the aforementioned analysis on the CCP leaders’ pragmatic 
promotion of patriotic education since 1987, it is suggested that as an important 
source of the CCP regime’s legitimacy, the history of modern China has been 
emphasized in the post-1989 “patriotic education campaign” (Callahan 2007: 186; 
Zhao 2004: 219).  
By comparing the most important documents pertaining to patriotic education 
released by the CCPCC before and after 1989, it is evident that while the targets of 
the patriotic education remain the same – Chinese youths, as Figure 3.1 shows, the 
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content of patriotic education in different periods does vary from each other.45
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Comparisons between two official documents on patriotic 
education issued by the CCPCC before and after 1989  
 Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee Propaganda Department and the CCP 
Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on 
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education 
[ZhonggongZhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian]  
Outline on the Implementation of 
Patriotic Education [Aiguo Zhuyi 
Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao] 
Date   July 2, 1983   August 8, 1994 
Content  1. A new look for (Chinese) motherland and the 
Developments and Achievements after 1978 
2. Modeling deeds of heroic figures and advanced 
community 
3. Successful experience of development 
4. Magnificent Chinese mountains and rivers as 
well as places of historic interest and scenic 
beauty  
5. Significant historical events and famous 
historical figures  
6. Outstanding (Chinese)artists and their works 
since ancient time  
7. Outstanding (Chinese) scientists and their 
contribution since ancient time 
8. (Chinese) cultural relics since ancient time  
9. The historical contribution of all ethnic groups 
to Chinese motherland  
10. (Chinese) patriots living in foreign countries 
and foreign patriots in the world    
1. The long history of the Chinese 
nationality, especially modern and 
contemporary history 
2. (Chinese) tradition and culture  
3. The basic outlines of CCP policies 
and the great achievements of 
modernization in China 
4. Chinese national conditions, 
especially in the context of the 
global environment 
5. Democracy and legal system in 
socialist China 
6. National defense and security in 
China 
7.  Unity among different ethnicity 
groups 
8.  The policy of “Peaceful 
Unification and One Country, Two 
Systems”.  
  
In the 1994 Outline, Chinese history (especially the history of modern and 
contemporary China), the CCP’s ideology and the national conditions are highlighted, 
while these salient themes were not particularly or clearly illustrated in the 1983 
Guideline.   
Also by comparing two more significant official documents issued by the MOE 
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 Both the CCPCC and the MOE also had their most important document in different periods. For the 
CCPCC, for instance, the “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda 
Department and the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic 
Propaganda Education” [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu 
Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued in 1983 could be taken as 
the most important document for patriotic education since it provided most comprehensive 
instructions for the implementations of patriotic education in all sectors of Chinese society, while the 
“Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao] issued in 
1994, is believed to have marked the peak of the patriotic education campaign after 1989. See, He 
(2007:57) and Zhao (1998: 292). 
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respectively in 1983 and 1991, which were supposed to follow the ideas of the 
CCPCC but mainly focused on the implementation of patriotic education in 
educational sectors, I discovered similar differences. In the MOE’s 1983 document, 
there was only one sentence used to describe the history course (especially the 
history of modern and contemporary China) as an important and useful source for 
patriotic education.46 However, in the MOE’s 1991 document, there were five 
paragraphs used to stress the importance of Chinese history (especially the history of 
modern and contemporary China) for the implementation of patriotic education, 
taking up more than half of the content of the document, which in total had 9 
paragraphs.47  
Regarding to the impacts of the Tiananmen Incident on the patriotic history 
curriculum and the CCP leaders’ efforts to use both Chinese history and the current 
national conditions to foster Chinese people’s patriotism and its own legitimacy, 
obvious contrasts were also found between two official documents respectively 
issued by the MOE in August 1983 and November 1989 for strengthening the 
teaching of history and geography class in primary and secondary schools. In the 
MOE’s 1989 document, the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which were 
concluded as preventing and resisting “the intervention of capitalist liberalization” 
and “democratic countries’ peaceful revolutions,” were added as the main reasons to 
explain why schools should strengthen the teaching of history (especially the history 
of modern and contemporary China) and geography in schools, while these were not 
mentioned in the 1983 document at all.48  
Finally, the importance attached to the history of modern and contemporary 
China was much more evident in the MOE’s document which was named as “State 
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 See “Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the ‘Opinion on 
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education’” [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu 
Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian de Tongzhi] issued on August 24, 1983.   
47
 See “State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developinfg Patriotic Education 
Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools” [Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai 
Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian] issued on April 25, 1991.   
48
 See “State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of Ideological and 
Political Education and Education on National Conditions in Primary and Secondary Language, 
History, Geography, and Other Courses” [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, 
Lishi,Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian] 
issued on November 8, 1989. Also see “Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and 
Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary School History and Geography Courses” [Jiaoyubu Guanyu 
Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi] issued on August 1, 1983.  
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Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the 
‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History 
and National Conditions’” in 1991. The document directly put it as a great strategy to 
strengthen the education on the history of modern and contemporary China and 
national conditions among the primary and secondary school students and called up 
the entire Chinese society to carry out this strategy thoroughly and efficiently. 49    
The history of modern and contemporary China began with the first Opium War 
between China’s Qing Dynasty and the British Government in 1840 and continues to 
date. China began its contemporary history with the set-up of the new PRC in 
October 1949. But before that, the 109-year long history of modern China was 
known as “the century of humiliation.” During this “humiliated century”, both China 
and the Chinese people had been through numerous traumatic wars and had suffered 
a great deal from the invasions of western imperialism and Japanese militarism. The 
Communist Party, which was formally established in 1921, had played an important 
role in safeguarding the Chinese people and the motherland through its determined 
resistance against foreign invaders, especially the Japanese militarists, during the 
wartime, and had finally won victory in the resistance against Japanese militarists. 
Thus, the nationalist credentials of the CCP are inextricably intertwined with the 
Chinese resistance to Japan’s invasion. As many scholars believed, this explains why 
CCP leaders emphasized the history of modern and contemporary China in their 
patriotic education campaign since 1989 (Gong and Teo 2010; Hamada 2003;Hughes 
2008; Moore 2010; Gries 1999; Reilly 2004; Wang 2008). 
Compared to the emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China 
in both 1980s and 1990s, the history of ancient China and the world, where Japan 
was mentioned as one of the neighboring countries of ancient China and one of the 
countries in the world, were relatively less stressed. However, when compared to the 
history textbooks before 1978, the history of ancient China and the world had been 
more fairly treated in both the 1980s’ and 1990s’ history curricula.   
After the new PRC was established, Chinese history curricula were largely 
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 See “State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the 
‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History and National 
Conditions’” [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa ‘Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandaishi ji 
Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao’ (Chugao) de Tongzhi] issued on August 27, 1991.  
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influenced by the Soviet Union curricula models and separated the curricula into 
“Chinese history” and “”world history (Muller 2011: 39). Before 1978, Chinese 
history curricula were written with classical Marxist history concepts and 
class-struggle principles. The world history thus was focused on the “daily growing 
peace camp” under the Soviet Union’s leadership and anti-colonial liberation 
movements and their necessary success (LSJ 2001b: 107). In this way, the West 
(including Japan) were either not mentioned or just appeared only in the context of 
imperialist aggression against China. After 1978, a new framework of history 
curricula started to emerge. In 1980s’ history textbooks, the successes of the 
capitalist countries were now conceded, and their innovative power was 
acknowledged. Structurally, new chapters on Western science, literature and art were 
also added though they were marked as “not relevant” for the examination (LSJ 
2001b:487). In 1990s’ history textbooks, Chinese history was to be taught in an 
ancient-modern ratio of 1:1, whereas world history was to remain mainly modern 
(LSJ 2001b: 512).  
As a result, both Japan’s friendly and bad relationships with China in ancient 
time were taught in 1980s’ and 1990s’ history classes. The story of Jianzhen and his 
trip to Japan in Tang Dynasty were well known to students and while Japanese 
pirates’ existence in East China Sea in Ming Dynasty was also acknowledged. As 
one of the capitalist countries in modern time and one of the militarist countries 
which launched the World War II, Japan’s success in capitalist reforms was praised 
while its inhuman Fascism in the World War II was condemned in the history 
curricula. In both  the history curricula in 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s Meiji 
Restoration, for example, was detailed and took up a chapter with 3 three lessons in 
the textbooks on world history. Accordingly, the situations of Japanese society in the 
1850s and during the Meiji Restoration were also introduced in details as well.50
 
  
Therefore, although it is evident that the history of modern and contemporary 
China was emphasized in the patriotic history curricula after 1989, the history of 
ancient China and the world, where more positive information about Japan was 
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 See Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in 
Full-time Middle Schools) (1986), p. 88; and 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi 
Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in Full-time Middle Schools of 
Nine-year Compulsory Education)(1992), p. 39.  
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mentioned, was also taught in the history classes before and after 1989, suggesting 
that the Chinese history curricula after 1978 overall was relatively moderate and 
neutral when describing Japan.         
 
3.4 The War of Resistance against Japan had been highlighted and the 
discourse of Japan’s atrocities had kept consistent before and after 1989.   
With an evident emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China at 
the official level, the War of Resistance against Japan during 1931-1945, which was 
claimed as China’s first complete victory against foreign invaders by Jiang Zemin 
and thus is central to the CCP’s legitimacy,51 is suggested to have been highlighted 
in the patriotic history curriculum after 1989. With “self-glorifying and 
other-maligning myths,” it is also believed that the “post-1989 patriotic education 
campaign” has reversed the previous cover-up of Japanese atrocities in Chinese 
history textbooks, which was mostly due to the need of a good Sino-Japanese 
relationship in face with the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and 
went to another extreme of arousing a sense of Chinese victimhood and demonizing 
Japan in 1990s (He 2007: 58-59; Reilly 2004: 280).  
     By examining the textbooks on China’s modern history for secondary schools, 
which were published by the People’s Education Press (hereafter PEP) – the biggest 
official press for designing and publishing guidelines for school curriculum (before 
2001) and all kinds of textbooks for schools – in 1985 and 1995, 52  it is 
unsurprisingly found that the War of Resistances Against Japan was actually the 
dominant theme of both textbooks, taking up almost half of the content of both 
textbooks (See Figure 3.2 and 3.3).53
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 See “Jiang Zemin’ s Speech at the Veterans’ Symposium, August 25, 1995,” in Tian Huan, eds. 
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji [Archives on Post-WWII Sino-Japanese Relations (Vol 2)], 
(Beijing, 1997), p.939.  
52
 Before 2001, under one history curriculum guideline, there may be different versions of history 
textbooks successively published by PEP in different years. The content of these different versions of 
textbooks are close and sometimes almost the same. For comparing textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s, 
here, I adopted the 1985 Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] for junior secondary 
schools under the 1978 Guideline and the 1995 Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]for 
junior secondary schools under the 1993 Guideline for examinations .     
53
 In PEP’s Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] (1985), there were a total of four 
sections, among which the section III was entirely devoted to the War of Resistance against Japan with 
the part on Japan’s atrocities included and this topic covered nearly half of the section II. In Zhongguo 
Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] (1995), however, there were a total of 17 lessons, among 
which seven lessons were about the War of Resistance against Japan and one lesson was about Japan’s 
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         Figure 3.2                             Figure 3.3 
       
The catalog of 1985 history textbook  The catalog of 1995 history textbook  
 
As suggested by Li Weike (2011:140), one of the leading editors of history 
textbooks in PEP, “from a Chinese perspective, the War of Resistance against Japan 
marked the first time in the modern era that the nation was completely victorious in 
its many wars of resistance against foreign aggression. It, therefore, occupies a 
central place in modern Chinese history.” Moreover, “China’s War of Resistance 
against Japan was an important part of the Second World War and made major 
contributions to the victory in the global war against fascism. Thus, in both Chinese 
and world history, this war is of great significance and is given extensive treatment in 
PRC textbooks.”   
Regarding the details about Japan’s atrocities, however, in the 1985 textbook, 
Japanese militarists’ atrocities were mainly concluded under two 
subtitles—“Japanese Militarists ‘Mop up’ [Da Saodang] the Anti-Japanese Bases 
[Kangri Genjudi]” and “Japanese Militarists Economically Plunder the Occupied 
Areas.” About 6 pages of this textbook were given for detailed elaborations but with 
no pictures.54 In the 1995 textbook, however, a particular lesson with also 6 pages 
was used to detail the Japanese militarists’ cruel rules, inhuman atrocities and 
barbarianism in the occupied areas with vivid pictures and specific examples, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
invasion in China in particular.    
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 PEP (1985), Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)], pp. 112-117.    
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the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese Unit 731 and so forth.55
 
 
Even though many more specific examples and vivid pictures about Japan’s 
atrocities during their invasions of China were provided in the 1995 textbook, these 
details took up a relatively low proportion of the textbooks when compared to the 
elaborate details focusing on the War of Resistances against Japan.56 These details 
about Japan’s atrocities, as suggested both by Reilly (2004:285) and by one of the 
textbook designers I interviewed in PEP, were brought about with a surge of 
academic researches on wartime history and Japan’s atrocities since the early 1980s 
in China in reaction to Japan’s revisionism of the later 1970s and 1980s. Take the 
research on the Nanjing Massacre as an example, as suggested by Zhang Xianwen, 
one Chinese historian who headed the earliest research on the Nanjing Massacre in 
Nanjing University,  
“In response to the textbook disputes with Japan in 1982, the earliest effort at 
academic scholarship (mainly conducted by four scholars in world history in 
Nanjing University at the very beginning) on the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese 
atrocities in China came in the mid-1980s, which was much later than Japan’s side. 
It was thus much later when the Nanjing Massacre was written into the history 
textbooks. So, Chinese populace did not know about the Nanjing Massacre until the 
early 1990s.”57  
What is more, the descriptions of Japan’s atrocities and invasions in China in 
the 1990s’ textbooks did not vary so much from the 1980s’ ones. The descriptions of 
the September 18th Incident (also known as the Manchurian Incident) in 1985 and 
1995 textbooks, for example, were quite similar in terms of the discourse on Japan’s 
roles in causing the Incident.  
In 1985 history textbook, it was written:  
In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Imperialist World 
(diguozhuyi shijie). In order to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese 
Imperialists decided to invade the Northeast (also known as Manchuria) of 
our country (China) and occupy the entire China step by step, when Chiang 
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 PEP (1995), Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)], pp. 64-69.  
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 1:7 in ratio 
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 Author’s interviews with Zhang Xianwen, who headed the earliest researches in Nanjing Massacre 
in China and now serves as the Director of the Research Institute of History in Nanjing University, Jan. 
9, 2011.    
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Kai Shek was focused on his domestic wars (with the Chinese Communist 
Party). With the intention to turn China into its colony, the Japanese 
Kwantung army designed a conspiracy and bombed the South Manchuria 
Railway at Liutiaohu, on the outskirts of Shenyang (also known as Mukden), 
during the night of September 18, 1931. The Kwantung army then called the 
bombing the work of Chinese forces and, in the name of self-defense, 
quickly seized control of Shenyang. The September 18th Incident so 
happened. 
( Zhongguo lishi (disice)1985: 67)  
In 1995 history textbook, it was written:  
In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Capitalist World. In order 
to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese imperialists strengthened their 
invasions in China. During the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese 
Kwantung army bombed the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu and 
called the bombing the work of Chinese forces. Taking this as an excuse, the 
Japanese Kwantung army soon embarked on military action to the base 
camp of Chinese northeast military and occupied Shenyang. This is so 
called the “September 18th Incident.” 
                             (Zhongguo Lishi (Disice)1995:32)  
Comparing the above descriptions on the September 18
th
 Incident in 1985’s and 
1995’s history textbooks, it is easier to find the differences between the discourses on 
Chiang Kai Shek (or Kuomintang) than the differences between the discourses on 
Japan. To the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which fought a bloody battle to gain 
its ruling position, Kuomintang was taken as a rival after the new PRC was founded, 
and thus, in the depiction of the War of Resistance against the Japanese in Chinese 
history textbooks, many paragraphs were used to condemn the KMT for 
collaborating with, or not resisting, the Japanese Army (Su 2011:148). This intention 
to take KMT as a rival or the “other” was still evident in the 1980s’ history textbooks. 
With the changes of the relationships between mainland and Taiwan and for the 
purpose of national unification, however, the historical discourses on the roles of 
Kuomintang in resistances against foreign invaders had been changed in the 1990s’ 
history textbooks. In 1990s, the history textbooks emphasized the cooperation more 
than the conflicts between the KMT and CCP and the KMT was instead mentioned 
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for its positive role in resisting foreign invaders in the textbooks.      
Therefore, although the War of Resistance against Japan was highlighted and 
the descriptions of Japan’s atrocities in history textbooks have been consistently 
negative and detailed, the Chinese government did not have the intention to stress or 
exaggerate Japanese invasions in China in history textbooks. As Li Weike (2011:144) 
further suggested, the descriptions of the wars and Japan’ atrocities in China actually 
intend to stress Chinese determined resistance against foreign invaders and that 
Japan’s instigation of war and massacre of Chinese people were inhumane violations 
of international law, but never placing an emphasis or exaggeration on the atrocities 
themselves.  
 
3.5 A comprehensive view of Japan in the new history curriculum since 2001  
Coming to the beginning of the 21st century, with the goal of an “emotional and 
value-based” education and for the purpose to turn China’s basic education from 
being exam-oriented to quality-oriented, China has undertaken a curriculum reform 
based on The Compendium of Curriculum Standards for Compulsory Education 
(tentative) [Jichu Jiaoyu Kecheng Gaige Gangyao (Shixing)] enacted by the MOE in 
2001 (2001a, quoted from Li 2011: 138).  
By “emotional and value-based ” education, in accordance with the new history 
curriculum standards, two aspects of emotion and values are highlighted in the new 
history curriculum: 1) the understanding of Chinese national conditions, an 
identification with national history and culture, a cultivation of a national spirit and 
patriotic sentiments; 2) an understanding of the diversities of human history and 
society, comprehension of and respect for cultural traditions of different regions, 
countries and nationalities, absorption of the outstanding achievements of human 
civilization and the formation of an open world-view. (2001b, quoted from Li 2011: 
143)   
The History Curriculum Standards for full-time compulsory education 
[Quanrizhi Jiaoyu Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun] (hereafter HCS) were issued by the 
MOE in 2001, setting guidelines for teaching arrangements and textbook compilation. 
With the HCS, secondary school history textbook compilation in China has greatly 
changed from the original “one syllabus, one version” to “one syllabus, many 
editions” (Li 2011: 137). Since 2001, not only PEP, but also other publishing houses 
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and presses could now enjoy autonomy for editing textbooks. Although textbooks 
compilation and writing must strictly correspond to the HCS and pass through the 
examinations of the National (or Provincial) Committee for Elementary, Junior and 
Senior Secondary School Textbook Approval [Quanguo (huo Shengji) Zhongxiaoxue 
Jiaocai Shending Weiyuanhui], the diversification of textbooks is encouraged by the 
history curriculum reform (2001a).  
As a result of the history curriculum reform, the history textbook editions 
available for junior secondary school have so far expanded into 10 versions.
58
 
Concerning senior high schools, four kinds of senior secondary school history 
textbooks have been published.
59 
These different versions of textbooks are now 
competing with each other as the local governments are permitted to choose among 
the published textbooks autonomously (Su 2011: 150).  
With a paradigm shift from political history to economic, cultural and social 
history in history academic research, the history curriculum reform has also 
enhanced content related to social, scientific, educational and cultural history, while 
still keeping its emphasis on political history (Su 2011: 149). Therefore, under this 
new curriculum, the history courses have been integrated with other courses, such as 
“science”, “society”, or “geography”, resulting in a series of new experimental 
history textbooks in schools. Furthermore, in many of these new history textbooks, 
topical arrangements crossing national borders and integrating Chinese and world 
history are adopted, in contrast to the chronological and regionally divided approach 
found in history textbooks written during the 1980s and 1990s (Li 2011: 137).  
Given such “radical” history curriculum reform, what are the “radical” changes 
in the imagery regarding Japan? How is Japan taught in classes using the new history 
curriculum?   
As previously discussed, in both 1980s’ and 1990s’ history textbooks, the 
history of modern and contemporary China was emphasized and the War of 
Resistance against Japan was highlighted with Japan’s atrocities in China detailed, 
while the history of Japan as one of the neighboring countries of China since ancient 
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 For details about each version, see Su Zhiling, “The ‘Others’ in Chinese History Textbooks: A Focus 
on the Relationship between China and Japan,” in Goteling Muller, ed. Designing History in East 
Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations, (NY, 2011), pp.149-150.  
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times and the history of Japan as one of the countries in the world were either almost 
ignored or less mentioned. Coming to the 21
st
 century, with the curriculum reform, 
content about Japan in Chinese textbooks, however, started to change (Su 2011: 147). 
Due to the curriculum reform, there have been various editions of history textbooks 
being used in different cities and different schools in China. Different editions of 
textbooks, though all adhere to HCS guidelines, have different arrangements and 
space distributions for different historical topics and events.  
Regarding to the content relevant to the history of the War of Resistance against 
Japan and Japan’s atrocities in China during the wartime, it is noted that compared to 
the previous editions, the length of these sections has been reduced either due to the 
topical arrangement of the content or the integration with other courses in the new 
history textbooks. The textbooks published by most of the press in Shanghai and by 
Beijing Normal University Press, for example, have reduced the space allotted to the 
content about the War of Resistance against Japan and Japanese atrocities due to the 
integrations between history and other sciences courses (Su 2011: 152). The 
textbooks published by PEP also reduced the space covering these two topics due to 
the topical arrangement of the new textbooks.
60
  
Looking at the most recent history curriculum standards, which were recently 
published by the MOE in 2011 and must be fully followed during the textbook 
compilation process, the War of Resistance against Japan and Japan’s atrocities, such 
as the Nanjing Massacre, are still listed as a dominant topic of modern Chinese 
history the same as before. What is different in the new history curriculum, however, 
is that it includes specific suggestions for history teachers engaged in hands-on 
learning activities outside the classroom, such as discussions in classes, watching 
movies and documentaries, and visiting historical relics and living war victims, etc.
61
 
Besides, Japan’s ancient, modern and contemporary history are all partially included 
in the respective sections of world history, depicting both Japan’s contributions and 
its harms to the world and showing a much more comprehensive view of Japan.
62
 
Therefore, as Su (2011: 152) concluded, regarding to the content and discourse on 
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 See ,for example, PEP (2008), Lishi [History], pp. 74-78.    
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Standards), Beijing:Beijing, Normal University Press,, p. 20.  
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Japan, most of the history curricula currently circulating in China are characterized 
with: 
“While keeping their condemnation of the Japanese invasion, Chinese history 
textbooks also began to praise Japan’s modern reforms, such as the Meiji 
Restoration, the democratic reforms after World War II, the successful economic 
recovery and the combination of traditional and modern culture. Japan’s 
developmental aid to other countries, including to China, is also appreciated in 
today’s textbooks.”  
In current PEP’s history, by contrasting two pictures of a Japanese soldier – one 
showing the soldier happily spending time with his family before joining the army 
and the other showing the same soldier bayoneting Chinese people with ferocious 
looks during the wars, the textbook is attempting to lead students to think about the 
great harm and calamities caused by wars.
63
 In so doing, the descriptions of wars 
and Japan’s atrocities in Chinese history textbooks aim to teach Chinese students that 
war is cruel, that the civilians massacred in war are blameless, that life should be 
cherished, and peace for humankind treasured, but never hatred or anti-sentiments 
towards Japan and any other country (Li 2011: 144). 
Coming to the classes in schools, under the new history curriculum with a goal 
of having “emotional and value-based” and “quality-oriented” education, history 
teachers have tried to introduce different aspects of Japan to students with 
comprehensive information. According to the teachers I interviewed in Nanjing, 
although they sometimes feel tensions between cultivating students’ patriotic 
sentiments and their respect for traditions and culture of Japan when coming to 
discuss some relevant issues, such as the origin of Japanese militarism and Yasukuni 
Shrine, they always try to teach students to examine different aspects of the issues 
and understand the issues from different perspectives and with respect and 
appreciations.
64
    
Following the instructions of HCS, history teachers have also tried different 
ways to teach students about the historical events. In Nanjing, for example, as 
suggested by one secondary school teacher I interviewed in the Memorial Hall of 
The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, most of the history teachers 
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in schools organize different extra-curricular activities, such as visiting the museum 
and memorial hall and the living victims, watching documentaries or movies and so 
forth, to allow the material to resonate with students and give them a better 
opportunity to understand the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s invasions in China as 
well as other wartime history. While in Shenzhen where there are not historical relics 
or relevant museums, history teachers, however, have to rely more on the Internet, 
documentaries, movies and TV programs, and other forms of media, to teach 
students about the wartime history. Added by one history teacher from a junior 
secondary school in Shenzhen,  
“Since many students are very interested in Japanese cartoons, one of my 
colleagues who is very good at drawing, has tried to use cartoons to teach his 
students the historical events. It works very well in helping students learn about 
Japan as well as the wartime history.”65  
In all, when the goal of cultivating both students’ patriotism and open-world 
view is pursued, the new history curriculum intends to teach student a more 
comprehensive view of Japan. With more liberal resources for updated information 
about different aspects of Japan and the popularity of Japanese products and cultures 
across China nowadays, teachers in history classes in schools, who are the mediators 
between the intended and implemented curriculum, have to give students more 
comprehensive information about Japan based on their own experience and 
understanding of Japan and the curriculum through their own innovative approaches.     
  
3.6 Conclusion  
With the perceived challenges for both the CCP and Chinese society after the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, China’s leaders have put many efforts into 
strengthening and reforming their ideological-political education through promoting 
a patriotic history curriculum in schools. In this patriotic history curriculum, the 
history of modern and contemporary China has been emphasized as an important 
source for patriotic education while the War of Resistance against Japan has been 
highlighted and Japanese atrocities have been detailed. Nonetheless, from both the 
official documents and different editions of history textbooks in 1980s and 1990s, it 
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 Author’s interview with secondary school teachers in Shenzhen on April 11, 2011.    
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is noted that Chinese patriotic history curriculum has focused more on Chinese 
heroic and adamant resistance against the invasion from Japan rather than purposely 
maligning Japan. It is also noticeable that the descriptions of Japanese atrocities in 
different editions of the history textbooks had been consistent even though they were 
negative. Coming to the new century, under a nationwide history curriculum reform 
in China, which aims at cultivating students a more balanced patriotic sentiments and 
an open world-view, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been taught through 
various ways in the history classes in secondary schools.  
Based on these empirical findings through comparative and content analysis, I 
thus come to conclude that the patriotic history education since 1978 in China has 
not been infused with an intended stress on Japan-related or anti-Japanese context as 
often assumed. By its content in both official and implemented levels, the patriotic 
history education in China has been aimed at and committed to teaching Chinese 
youths to be patriotic through its conventional hero folktale with such functional 
units as endurance, struggles and ultimate victory (Hamada 2003:109), but not 
through exaggerating Japan’s atrocities in modern China or purposely maligning 
Japan.  
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Chapter 4 
Students’ Reactions to the Patriotic Education and Their 
Perceptions of Japan 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter empirically studies the “creator”— Chinese patriotic 
education before and after 1989 in both official and school levels. It particularly 
examines the history narrative of Japan in patriotic history curriculum in Chinese 
secondary school and shows how and what teachers teach students about Japan in the 
history classes. This chapter, on the other way around, focuses on the “receiver” – 
Chinese youths, and their reactions to the patriotic history curriculum in schools.   
Relying on survey results as well as content analysis on relevant textual 
materials, this chapter starts by discussing how Chinese youths perceive Japan and 
what their understandings of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are. It then comes to 
address the focus of this Chapter: how do Chinese youths react to the patriotic 
education curriculum in schools? Based on these discussions, this chapter finally 
goes back to answer the main research question of this study: What effects does 
patriotic education have on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan?  
  
4.2 Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan  
As mentioned before, public opinion polls conducted by both Chinese and 
Japanese organizations since the late-1980s have shown that Chinese in general 
harbor consistently negative attitudes towards Japan, especially since the mid-1990s 
(Kobayashi 2008: 89). Yet, having grown up in a more open Chinese society with all 
kinds of Japanese products as well as influences from Japanese modern cultures, 
what attitudes do Chinese youths nowadays have towards Japan? Although Chinese 
youths have been indeed largely involved in the frequent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations across mainland China in the last two decades, we have 
simultaneously witnessed an overwhelming popularity of Japanese products and 
modern Japanese culture among Chinese youths while the economic and cultural 
exchanges between two sides have been greatly boosted.  
Based on the empirical data from my survey with 643 secondary school students 
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in 8 mainland cities and recent surveys conducted with college students and Chinese 
populace in general by both independent scholars and research institutes, I thus 
firstly try to obtain a more genuine picture of Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan 
nowadays.  
 
4.2.1 Multi-faceted rather than Simplistic  
Most previous studies have commonly analyzed Chinese attitudes toward Japan 
in a dichotomous manner and particularly focused on the increase/decrease of either 
the negative or positive attitudes Chinese have towards Japan. From my survey with 
secondary school students, however, I find out a majority of “moderate” attitudes 
towards Japan among students (see Figure 4.1), which suggests that the majority of 
the students hold neither negative nor positive views of Japan.   
 
      Figure 4.1. Students’ general perceptions of Japan66 (N
＊
=640) 
Degree Value Percent (%) 
Very Unfavorable 9.9 
 1 6.1 
 2 3.8 
Unfavorable 12.3 
 3 6.1 
 4 6.2 
Moderate   52.2 
 5 25.0 
 6 27.2 
Favorable   20.4 
 7 10.6 
 8 9.8  
Very Favorable 4.7 
 9 2.2 
 10 2.5 
Not sure       0.5 
Notes: 
＊
N is the valid cases in total. 
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 A 10-point scale (ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable) was offered for students to 
indicate their level of favorable/unfavorable attitudes towards Japan by a number between 10~1 (10 
and 1 included). Since values in this 10-point scale are continuous and higher values are for more 
favorable attitudes, for the purpose of data analysis, we equally divided ten points into five categories 
– very favorable (10~9), favorable (8~7), moderate (6~5), unfavorable (4~3) and very unfavorable 
(2~1). (See Figure 4.1)   
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Surprising as this result seems to be, it is nonetheless not new. A majority of 
moderate attitudes were also found in a regional survey conducted amongst Chinese 
youths by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS in 2008.67 Many of the previous 
public opinion polls on the general Chinese populace since 1988 in fact had a 
majority or quite a large number of respondents demonstrating moderate attitudes 
towards Japan as well (See Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Moderate Attitudes in the Previous Public Opinion Polls since 198868 
 
NO. Time  Organizer Moderate Attitudes (%) 
1 Oct-10 Insight China  43.0  
2 Oct-08 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 31.2  
3 Apr-07 Oriental Outlook 40.4  
4 Sep-06 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 37.5  
5 Aug-06 China Daily and Genron NPO (Japan) 51.5  
7 Aug-05 China Daily and Genron NPO (Japan) 46.8  
8 Aug-05 Globe ．Sina.com 43.6  
10 Dec-04 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 53.6  
11 Dec-02 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 43.3  
12 Sep-02 Asahi Shimbun 35.0  
14 Sep-97 Asahi Shimbun 51.0  
15 Jun-97 Asahi Shimbun 35.0  
16 Feb-97 China Youth Daily 43.9  
17 Jan-96 Fudan University 48.9  
18 Dec-92 China National Situation Resaerch Association (CNSRA) 31.0  
19 Dec-88 Jilin University 35.0  
   
Methodologically speaking, reasons for respondents to hold moderate attitudes 
vary and as Bailey (1987:133-134) suggested, sensitivity of the research topic may 
cause respondents to be reluctant to expose their positions. It is indeed possible that 
respondents in my survey avoid expressing their favorable or unfavorable attitudes 
towards Japan due to the potential political sensitivity of the research topic under 
certain circumstances. Nevertheless, a majority of moderate attitudes towards Japan 
among secondary school students in my survey may imply that instead of seeing 
                                                             
 
67
 The survey was conducted with 591 secondary school students and college students from Beijing, 
Shanghai and Hohhot (the capital city of Inner Mongolia). 55.0% of the 591 students held moderate 
attitudes to Japan. See Zhang (2009).   
68
For the public opinion poll conducted in 2010 by Insight China, see 
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20101108/104125.shtml; for the one conducted by CASS in 2008, see the 
Japanese Studies Institute of CASS (2009); for the others, see Kobayashi (2008).  
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Japan in a dichotomous way, Chinese secondary school students may perceive Japan 
from with both positive and negative orientations and have multi-faceted perceptions 
of Japan.  
Chinese youths’ multi-faceted perceptions of Japan have also been pointed out 
and discussed in more recent surveys particularly done with Chinese college students. 
In Sha’s survey with 410 college students from Xiamen University in 2008, for 
example, Sha (2010: 3) found out that college students’ attitudes toward Japan varied 
from Japanese culture, people and government. When Sha asked students to describe 
their perceptions of Japan with two words (including nouns, adjectives, names of 
people, etc.), Sha finally obtained as many as 8.18% neutral adjectives, of the 550 
words provided by students (Sha 2010: 4).  
Sha’s survey results somehow coincide with my survey result. As shown by 
Figure 4.3, when students were asked about their views on different characteristics of 
Japanese people, it turned out that most of the students surveyed agreed with both 
positive and negative statements about Japanese. They on the one hand thought that 
the Japanese are polite, responsible and discipline, but on the other hand, took the 
Japanese impenitent, arrogant and aggressive.  
 
Figure 4.3. Views on Different Characteristics of Japanese69 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
/Agree (%) 
Neutral  
(%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
/Disagree (%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Japanese are polite 66.9 22.7 8.5  1.9 100 (N
＊
=643) 
Japanese are responsible 70.8 21.0 5.9  2.3 100 (N=643) 
Japanese are disciplined 69.1 20.0 8.2 2.7 100 (N=641) 
Japanese are impenitent 45.6 32.0 18.0 4.4 100 (N=641) 
Japanese are arrogant 48.5 30.7 17.1 3.7 100 (N=641) 
Japanese are aggressive 68.6 20.6 8.3 2.5 100 (N=641) 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.  
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 Students were provided a five-point statement (5-1) ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree to measure their agreements with the six items describing both positive and negative 
characteristics of Japanese people in the questionnaire. For the purpose of analysis, however, 
“strongly agree” and “agree” are combined as a group while “strongly disagree” and “agree” are 
combined as another group. For original data, see Survey Result in Appendix II 
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Students’ multi-faceted understanding of Japan was further confirmed in my 
in-depth interviews with 10 secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing. 
When students were individually interviewed and asked about their general 
perceptions of Japan, almost all of the 10 students, however, answered that Japanese 
are both “good” (hao) and “bad” (huai). Although different students gave different 
reasons for Japanese being “good” and “bad”, in general, students hold negative 
perceptions of Japanese because they thought that Japanese militarists who once 
invaded China were cruel and aggressive, while the current Japanese [people] who 
do not truly reflect on and even attempt to whitewash the war crimes that their 
ancestors committed during the wartime are arrogant and impenitent. On the other 
hand, however, they were impressed by Japanese politeness and self-discipline. All 
the 10 students appreciated the good quality of Japanese products very much. Some 
of them expressed their great fancy for Japanese cartoons and movies. Typically, four 
senior high school students attributed the good quality of Japanese products and the 
post-war economy miracle in Japan to the diligent Japanese people but blamed 
Japanese militarists for their brutal invasion in China and other Asian countries.  
Chen Shengluo’s in-depth interviews with college students in Beijing, Fujian 
and Henan in 2001 revealed similar results. College students, as he concluded, 
clearly indicated their appreciations of certain Japanese national spirits, high 
technology and modern culture, even though their general perceptions of Japan 
tended to be negative (Chen 2003: 24).  
Based on all these survey data, it is obvious that Chinese students’ perceptions 
of Japan are not as simplistic as they are usually assumed and widely believed. 
Chinese students, who are overall more liberal and better informed nowadays, 
actually perceive Japan from multiple perspectives and have multi-faceted rather 
than dichotomous perceptions of Japan.     
 
4.2.2 More rational than nationalistic   
Chinese youths’ multi-faceted views of Japan can be further proved by their 
rational views on Japan and the controversial issues between China and Japan. By 
“rational”, here I try to suggest, as is also supported by the survey data below, that 
Chinese youths tend to adopt an approach with more liberal and pragmatic rationality 
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but less subjective and emotional nationalism to understand Japan and Sino-Japanese 
relations. In other words, although it is inevitable for Chinese students to posses and 
demonstrate certain levels of nationalist sentiments when looking at Japan, which is 
one of several foreign countries invading China, Chinese students nowadays manage 
to perceive Japan in a more liberal, reasonable and pragmatic way.  
My surveys firstly found a more liberal understanding of the controversial 
issues between China and Japan among the students surveyed. As Figure 4.4 
indicates, when asked about their views on wartime history and the current disputes 
between China and Japan,
70
 less than half of the students strongly disliked the issue 
concerning Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, while a majority of 
the students hold the same views on the issues regarding wartime history, textbook 
disputes, and territorial disputes. Accordingly, there are relatively more students not 
against Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine than students not against 
the other disputes. (As highlighted in Figure 4.4) 
Similar results are also found in students’ responses to the question of whether 
they would demonstrate against Japan due to the disputes between China and Japan.71 
(See Figure 4.5) 
 
                                                             
 
70
 To measure this dimension, students were asked: To what extent, if any, do you dislike the 
following issues: 1) Japanese aggression in China during wartime; 2) Japanese right-wingers’ revisions 
of history textbooks; 3) Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 4) Japan’s competition 
with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea? 5) strongly dislike, 4) 
dislike, 3) somewhat dislike, 2) not dislike, 1) not dislike at all, and 0) not sure. The listed disputes 
obviously do not cover all bilateral disputes between China and Japan. The dispute over Japan’s 
“apology”, for example, is not included in the scale. However, these disputes chosen the disputes most 
frequently mentioned by students when they answered my open-ended questions about their 
knowledge about the bilateral disputes between China and Japan in the pre-tests.     
71
 Since wartime history has been past, it is inappropriate to ask students whether they will 
demonstrate due to Japanese aggression in China during wartime. Therefore, student were asked: 
Given permissions to demonstrate in China, please tell us if you will: 1) attend, or 2) not attend the 
legal demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and Japan: 1) Japanese 
right-wingers’ revision of history textbooks; 2) Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 3) 
Japan’s competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea. 
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Figure 4.4.  Views on Controversial Issues between China and Japan 
 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents. 
 
  Figure 4.5.  Attending demonstrations against Japan due to the disputes 
between China and Japan 
 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents. 
 
Why are there relatively fewer students against and willing to demonstrate 
against Japan for Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine? Based on my 
content analysis on students’ answers to the open questions which asked students to 
 Strongly 
Dislike 
(%) 
Dislik
e 
(%) 
Somewha
t Dislike  
(%) 
Slightl
y 
Dislik
e (%) 
Don’t 
Dislik
e at 
All 
(%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese 
aggression in 
China during 
wartime 
75.1 18.0 5.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 100 
(N=643
) 
2. Japanese 
right-wingers’ 
revisions of 
history textbooks 
69.6 17.0 
 
8.7 
   
2.6 0 2.0 
 
100  
(N=642
) 
3.Japanese prime 
ministers’  
visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine 
45.3 24.8 
 
13.0 9.8 
 
1.1 
 
5.9 
 
100  
(N=640
) 
4. Japan’s 
competition with 
China over the 
sovereignty of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Island and East 
China Sea 
65.3 
 
22.9 
 
9.0 
 
1.2 
 
0.5 
 
1.1 
 
100 
(N=643
) 
 Yes 
(%) 
Not (%) Not Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1.Japanese right-wingers’ revisions of 
history textbooks 
55.6 40.2 4.2 100 (N
＊
=639) 
2.Japanese prime ministers’  
visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
38.4 58.7 2.8 100 (N=635) 
3.Japan’s competition with China over the 
sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and 
East China Sea 
60.5 35.8 3.8 100 (N=640) 
  
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
explain reasons for their options in the questionnaire, the biggest reason cited by the 
students, who chose not to against Japan due to Japanese prime ministers’ visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, is that “Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are 
personal behaviors and domestic issues within Japan, and thus should not be 
intervened in by foreigners.”72  
Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine have been commonly taken 
as one of the major disputes bothering Sino-Japanese relations and the main reason 
for the “cold” political relations between Chinese and Japanese governments 
between 2001 and 2005 (Liu 2007; Wan 2006). While the Chinese government 
usually criticizes Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine as a serious 
offense which harms the feelings of Chinese and other Asian countries, Chinese 
students seem less critical on this issue and would take it as Japan’s domestic affair. 
This clearly reveals certain levels of disparity between the Chinese official narrative 
and students’ understanding of the issue.  
The fact that recent Japanese prime ministers have avoided actually visiting 
Yasukuni Shrine may also contribute to the easing of Chinese students’ criticisms on 
this dispute. Nonetheless, students’ liberal understanding of Japanese prime 
ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine is possible in today’s situation when Chinese 
students are better informed and have a more liberal and comprehensive 
understanding of Japan. Without direct experiences of the war and occupation but 
living in a relatively more open Chinese society, as Figure 4.6 shows, students 
nowadays generally know about the different aspects of Japan and Sino-Japanese 
relations, though the extent to which they know about different aspects varies. It is 
thus not groundless to argue that Chinese students nowadays tend to have more 
comprehensive knowledge about Japan and understand Sino-Japanese relations in a 
more liberal way. This also makes it possible for Chinese students to perceive Japan 
with less subjectivity and emotional nationalism, but with more reasonable 
considerations and pragmatic rationality.  
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 For further analysis, I asked respondents to give reasons for their decisions. Two biggest reasons 
suggested by respondents who decided not to demonstrate against in terms of Japanese prime 
ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are “It is the freedom of Japanese prime ministers” and “It is the 
domestic issues of Japan”.                                                                                                                     
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Figure 4.6.  How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese 
relations?73 
 
 Know Very Well 
/Know/ Somewhat 
Know    
(%) 
 Know Very Little / 
Don’t Know at  
All (%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese modern culture and 
Japanese products 
92.4  7.6 100 (N
＊
=643) 
2. Japanese traditional culture 79.6  20.4 100 (N=642) 
3. Japan as an island country with 
limited natural resources and 
numerous earthquakes 
93.3  6.7 100 (N=638) 
4. Japanese emperors 70.3  29.7 100 (N=641) 
5. Meiji Restoration 74.0  26.0 100 (N=642) 
6. Friendly exchanges between 
China and Japan in ancient time 
87.7  12.3 100 (N=640) 
7. Japanese Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in China 
48.4 51.6 100 (N=643) 
8. Japan's aggression in modern 
China 
94.0 6.0 100 (N=631) 
9. Historical disputes between China 
and Japan 
72.1 27.9 100 (N=642) 
10. Territorial disputes between 
China and Japan 
92. 4  7.6 100 (N=642) 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.  
 
As figure 4.6 shows, Chinese students nowadays are very much impressed by 
Japanese products and modern culture (92.4%). This result seems contradictory to 
the fact that Chinese students from time to time raise high a slogan of “boycotting 
Japanese products” to go against Japanese governments for their misdeeds to China. 
One thus may question whether Chinese students really boycott Japanese products in 
their daily life, or, it is just a nationalistic slogan.  
A recent survey particularly undertaken with the Chinese youths in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Hohhot has shed light on this question. It showed that as a matter of 
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 A five-point statement was offered to measure the extent students know about the listed aspects 
about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, ranging from “know very well” (5) to “not know at all”(1). 
For the purpose of analysis, “know very well”, “know” and “somewhat know” were added up together 
as one group, while “know little” and “not know at all” were added up as the other. For original data, 
see Survey Results in Appendix II 
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fact, the majority of the Chinese youths would rather make a rational choice between 
Japanese products and other products based on the price and quality than emotionally 
boycotting Japanese products for political reasons. 74  With an overwhelming 
popularity of Japanese products, fashion and popular cultures among Chinese youths 
and the increasing economic and cultural exchanges between two countries, it is 
more evident that Chinese youths in fact tend to have a rational calculation instead of 
being emotionally nationalistic when coming to decide what product to buy.    
Chinese youths’ rational views of Japan could also be implied in their pragmatic 
efforts to divide Japanese society into different sectors and treat the different sectors 
according to the extent of the damages which these different sectors have given or 
might give to China. As Sha found out in her survey, college students’ positive 
attitudes toward Japanese culture, Japanese people and Japanese governments 
successively decreased as the possibility that these three sectors might bring harms to 
China successively increase (Sha 2010:3).  
From my own survey with secondary school students, it is also noticeable that 
students held different attitudes towards the Japanese military and Japanese people. 
In a scale for measuring students’ views towards different issues after their visits to 
the patriotic education bases concerning Japanese invasion in modern China, 89.0% 
of the students in total strongly agree and agree that Japanese militarists were cruel, 
while only 47.6% of the students strongly agree and agree that Chinese should hate 
Japanese (As highlighted in Figure 4.7). There are also as many as 62.9% of the 
students strongly agree and agree that both Chinese and Japanese people were 
victims of the wars (See Figure 4.7).  
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 66.3% of the respondents held this point of view toward Japanese products while only 6.8% of the 
respondents said they will never buy a Japanese product. See Zhang (2009:143).   
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Figure 4.7. Attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and wartime history after 
participating in the extra-curricular activities75 
 Strongly 
Agree/ Agree 
 (%) 
Neutral  
(%) 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
(%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
      
1. Japanese militaries were cruel. 89.0  9.0 1.6  0.4 100 (N
＊
=511) 
2. Chinese soldiers were great. 77.3  14.9 5.9  2.0 100 (N=511) 
3. Chinese should hate Japanese.  47.6 34.8 15.7  2.0 100 (N=509) 
4. Chinese fellows who victimized 
in the wars should be mourned 
forever. 
84.8 11.4 3.6  0.2 100 (N=507) 
5. Both the Chinese and Japanese 
peoples were victims of the wars. 
62.9  21.0 14.3  1.8 100 (N=509) 
6. Take history as guidance and 
look into the future. 
75.9  17.5 5.7  1.0 100 (N=509) 
7. Love Chinese motherland and 
revive Chinese nation.  
85.9 12.5 1.6  0 100 (N=511) 
8. Love peace and fight against the 
wars.  
92.2 6.1 1.2  0.6 100 (N=511) 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents 
 
Moreover, as the Chinese older generations do, Chinese youths nowadays also 
try to distinguish the majority of Japanese people from the small batch of Japanese 
right-wingers. One student who I had in-depth interviews with, for example, 
seriously blamed the Japanese right-wingers for their efforts to revise the Japanese 
history textbooks and “whitewash” the historical facts, but believed that the revised 
textbooks were not widely accepted by most of the Japanese people. 76
 
   
In the scale for measuring students’ views towards different issues after their 
visits to the patriotic education bases, again, there are totally 75.9% of the students 
who strongly agree and agree with Chinese official approach to take history as 
guidance and look into the future. There are also as many as 92.2% of the students 
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 Students were posed a question of “Do you agree with the following statements after watching 
movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to Japanese aggression in 
China during wartime?” and a five-point statement to measure the extent to which they agree with the 
listed statements. The five-point statement ranges from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1). 
For the purpose of data analysis, “strongly agree” and “agree” were added up together as one group 
while “strongly disagree” and “disagree” were added up as the other.  For original data, see Survey 
Results in Appendix II.  
76
 Author’s interview with a senior high student from Shenzhen in April 2, 2011.   
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who strongly agree and agree to cherish world peace and go against the wars (See 
Figure 4.7).  
From the aforementioned survey results on students’ attitudes towards the 
different disputes between China and Japan and the wartime history, although 
students seem more radical regarding the historical disputes and territorial disputes, it 
does not necessarily mean that students hold exclusively nationalistic attitudes 
towards Japan. Students’ strong support for a peaceful and far-sighted approach to 
deal with the historical disputes and a truly love for world peace further proved that 
Chinese youths are by no means adopting exclusive nationalism towards Japan. 
Rather, they tend to look at Japan and deal with disputes between China and Japan in 
a more rational manner. As both Chinese and Japanese scholars believe, Chinese 
youths, though embedded with a collective memory of historical traumas in the 
“humiliated century”, somehow manage to deal with the bilateral disputes rationally 
(Chen 2003, Sha 2008, Suzuki 2007).   
 
4.3 Students’ reactions to patriotic history curriculum  
Having examined the history narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic education 
(“creator”) in the previous chapter and the perceptions of Japan among Chinese 
youths (“receivers”) above, it is still hard to conclude the effects of Chinese patriotic 
education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan based on the assumption of 
“creator-receiver connections.” It is obvious that Chinese youths’ perceptions of 
Japan do not perfectly fit with the official narrative of Japan in the patriotic history 
curriculum though a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced in 
recent history classes and Chinese youths nowadays indeed tend to have 
multi-faceted perceptions of Japan.  
While schools have been widely taken as one of most controllable and thus 
effective socialization agents, as aforementioned, the theory of political socialization 
also stresses the important role of students, who are the “receivers” of the schooling, 
in deciding the effectiveness of school education, and admits the possibility of 
students’ resistance to the political messages embedded within the curriculum. 
Therefore, the causal linkages, if there are any, between the patriotic education 
curriculum in schools and students’ perceptions of Japan, are actually not that 
straightforward. It, however, has to go through students’ reception and “digestion” of 
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the messages from the patriotic education curriculum in schools. Whether and how 
students actually take in the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic education 
curriculum should largely depend on students’ reactions to the curriculum.  
How do Chinese students, then, react to the patriotic history curriculum in 
schools? Do they receive or resist the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic 
curriculum? To what extent do they “digest” those messages received? To address 
these questions, I thus posed two questions to the students surveyed to inquire about 
their views towards what has been taught about Japan in schools and the consistency 
between the narratives of Japan in schools and the ones from sources out of schools.  
Students were firstly asked, “Which have you been taught about the most in 
your classes: the positive aspects of Japan or negative ones?” According to students’ 
responses to the question, the majority of the students (67.5%) chose “both”, which 
suggests that students have learned equally positive and negative messages about 
Japan (See Figure 4.8). This result somehow matches with the aforementioned fact in 
the previous chapter that the reformed history curriculum since 2001 has introduced 
a more comprehensive and balanced view of Japan, even though other 22.2% of the 
students thought that what has been taught about Japan in schools is more negative 
than positive, which is more than the students thinking in the opposite way (8%) (See 
Figure 4.8). This result therefore reveals that Chinese students to some extent receive 
the information about Japan provided by the schools, and that the information 
received, if there is any, covers both positive and negative aspects of Japan while the 
negative are more than the positive.  
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In the questionnaire, I successively asked students, “Do you think what you 
have learned about Japan in schools is consistent with what you have learned about 
Japan out of schools?” Based on students’ responses, again, I find out a majority of 
students holding moderate attitudes (61.0%), which suggests that most students 
thought that some of the contents about Japan in school curricula are consistent with 
the information about Japan outside of schools while some are not (See Figure 4.9). 
Except for this majority of “moderate attitudes”, however, there were 32.2% students 
thinking that the narrative of Japan in schools is consistent with the ones out of 
schools while only 3.3% of students thought in the opposite way (See Figure 4.9).  
 
 
 
Additionally, based on students’ responses to the question pertaining to the 
effects of textbooks and teachers on their perceptions of Japan, it is shown that more 
students did not think that their perceptions of Japan were changed by the both 
textbooks and teachers (respectively 43.1% and 47.4%, as highlighted in Figure 4.10). 
According to the aforementioned explanation of redundancy in chapter I, these 
results in all imply the possibility that students may compromise their receptions of 
the information from schools since what has been taught about Japan in schools may 
be just a repetition of the information from other resources out of schools.  
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Figure 4.10 How did your perceptions of Japan change due textbooks / 
teachers? 
 
 Worsened 
(%) 
Remained 
the same (%) 
Improved 
(%) 
Not Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Textbooks 35.0 43.1 17.4 4.5 100 
 (N
＊
=638) 
Teachers 24.0 47.4 24.2 4.4 100 
 (N=633) 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents. 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, as shown by Figure 4.11, most of the students nowadays took the 
Internet and other mass media as their most important source of information about 
Japan (69.1%) while far fewer students thought school education are most important 
for them to learn about Japan (21.9%). This also proved that schools are not the most 
important information sources for the most students to learn about Japan. It is thus 
evident that students’ reception of schools’ narrative of Japan is limited, even though 
students do receive information about Japan from schools to certain extent and the 
information within schools has more consistency than inconsistency with the ones 
out of schools.  
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From Figure 4.9, it is also found that the effects of textbooks and teachers on 
students’ perceptions of Japan, if there are any, are contradictory. This finding is 
more important in the sense that it reveals teachers’ resistance to the intended history 
curriculum as well. According to Grioux (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349), 
neither students nor teachers resemble the “social puppets” and both teachers and 
students demonstrate forms of resistance to the “hegemonic” contexts in the intended 
curriculum. Teachers’ resistance to the intended curriculum will counteract the 
effects of textbooks. It thus may again hinder students’ receptions and “digestion” of 
the intended curriculum and strengthen students’ resistance to the intended 
curriculum.  
According to my interviews with history teachers in both Nanjing and Shenzhen, 
parts of which have been revealed in chapter III, teachers do have their own 
interpretation of the history and they could actually teach students their own 
understanding of the history in classes although they have to strictly follow the 
official curriculum and teaching guideline by principle and constrained by all kinds 
of competitive examinations for students in China. With the reformed history 
curriculum, history teachers have tried their own ways to teach students a more 
comprehensive view of Japan, especially when they find tensions between cultivating 
students’ patriotic sentiments and teaching students broader knowledge about Japan.    
Being better informed and with more liberal mind-sets, Chinese students 
nowadays, though they have to pragmatically deal with the coursework in schools 
due to the pressure from examinations and may not well receive and “digest” the 
history curriculum due to the reasons of redundancy, teachers, etc., also tend to be 
more political-ideological independent and thus more skeptical towards the political 
messages embedded in the hidden curriculum in schools. Students’ unofficial 
thinking of Japanese PMs’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as aforementioned, not only 
shows students’ rational perceptions of Japan, but also shows students’ resistance to 
the official narrative of Japan in school history curriculum, especially the negative 
narrative of Japan, which tends to contradict students’ own images of Japan based on 
their own experience and information from other more liberal sources. This explains 
the disparity between the intended official narrative and students’ actual 
understandings of Japan.   
 In sum, by examining Chinese students’ reactions to the patriotic history 
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curriculum in secondary schools using the survey data, it is found that although 
students receive the information about Japan from schools to certain extent, students 
do not well “digest” the information received and tend to resist the negative narrative 
of Japan, which is suspected to be embedded with political-ideological propaganda 
or national myth making messages.  
 
4.4 The effects of patriotic education on students’ perceptions of Japan   
As shown above, the empirical findings of this study so far do not support the 
assumption of “creator-receiver connections,” but reveal that students’ reactions to 
the patriotic history curriculum do matter in deciding the effects of Chinese patriotic 
education and the Chinese patriotic education tends to have relatively weak effects 
on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan. 
 
4.4.1 A less important role compared to mass media  
Previous surveys have consistently asked Chinese respondents their sources of 
information about Japan. With the developments of technology and more alternatives 
for communication, the sources for Chinese to learn about Japan change over time. 
For the purpose of this study, I asked students about their views on different possible 
sources as well. As discussed earlier and shown by Figure 4. 11, the majority of the 
students (69.1%) chose Internet, TV programs and other mass media as the most 
important sources for them to learn about Japan, while only 21.9% of the students 
selected school education, followed by experience of families, relatives, friends 
(2.6%) and personal experiences (1.9%).  
This result is not surprising in today’s context. It is consistent with the results 
from the nationwide public opinion polls jointly conducted by China Daily and the 
Japanese Genron NPO since 2005 as well as the ones conducted by the Institute of 
Japan Studies of CASS since 2002.77 In general, most of the Chinese populace 
nowadays indeed learns major information about Japan from different kinds of mass 
media rather than other sources and this is just more obvious among Chinese students 
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 For results of the 6 surveys of China Daily and Japanese Genron NPO from 2005 to 2010, see 
http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=17&It
emid=159; For results of the most recent survey in 2011, see 
http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum2011.pdf. For results of surveys conducted by Institute of Japan 
Studies of CASS, see Institute of Japan Studies (2002, 2004, 2006) and Wang (2009).       
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today.78
 
 
It is not the intention of this study to make comparisons among the effects of 
different sources in influencing students’ perceptions of Japan. However, 
comparisons among the roles of different sources are helpful to “locate” the role of 
school education as a source of information about Japan in a broad sense. By 
comparisons, it seems obvious that the Internet and other mass media are playing 
much bigger roles than schools in providing students’ information about Japan. It is 
also implied, as aforementioned, that students may tend to compromise their 
receptions of messages from schools rather than the ones from the Internet and other 
mass media if these two messages meet conflicts or redundancies. This well explains 
why more consistency between information inside and outside of schools could not 
necessarily lead to students’ stronger receptions of the information from schools, and 
further confirms the relatively less important role of patriotic education in schools at 
least as a source for information about Japan when compared to the Internet and 
other mass media.  
 
4.4.2 Not as effective as it is assumed   
According to the Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education, which 
was issued by the Chinese Communist Party in 1994, patriotic education in schools is 
implemented mainly through the following three approaches: textbooks, teachers and 
extra-curricular activities (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 1994). To 
fully examine of the effects of patriotic education, I thus inquire the effects of all 
three dimension respectively.   
Students then were asked to evaluate the direct impacts of these approaches on 
their perceptions of Japan in my survey. As is highlighted in Figure 4.10 above, 
nearly half of the students suggest that their perceptions of Japan remain the same. In 
other words, their perceptions of Japan were not changed by both the textbooks and 
teachers in classes.  
In reality, “remain the same” could be understood in two ways. First, as 
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 Due to the bigger popularity of Internet among younger people, it is reasonable to assume that 
among all the mass media, it may be the Internet that plays a relatively bigger role in influencing 
Chinese youth’s perceptions of Japan. But this is not the focus of this study. I thus put the Internet 
together with the other mass media so as to compare with the role of school education. 
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discussed earlier, students may resist the information from textbooks and teachers, 
and thus their perceptions of Japan are not affected by both the textbooks and 
teachers at all. Second, students may well receive information about Japan from their 
classes, but the information they received from school classes is the same as the 
information they received from sources outside of the schools, therefore their 
perceptions of Japan remain the same.  
Both of these two situations exist among students I had in-depth interviews with. 
Some students said that they did not learn that much information about Japan from 
classes, but received information mainly through the Internet and newspapers, and 
thus their perceptions of Japan were not affected by either the textbooks or teachers 
in classes; some students, however, suggested that they had indeed learnt different 
aspects about Japan from classes, but what they had learnt from classes was almost 
the same as what they had known about Japan from their families, newspapers and 
the Internet, where they learned major information about Japan, and thus textbooks 
and teachers in classes do not really change their perceptions of Japan.79 
 In either way, it is clear that the effects of textbooks and teachers do not work 
out independently, but have to interact with the effects of other sources and are 
largely constrained by the effects of other sources. Moreover, as discussed before, 
from Figure 4.10 we also see that the effects of textbooks and teachers on students’ 
perceptions of Japan themselves tend to contradict with each other. This suggests that 
the effects from textbooks and teachers will counteract with each other and both two 
factors consequently could not be as effective as is usually assumed.     
 
4.4.3 Effective as patriotic education but not as “anti-Japanese” education   
What about, then, the effects of the curriculum through extra-curricular 
activities? Could the patriotic education through extra-curricular activities make a 
difference in influencing students’ perceptions of Japan?     
    As mentioned in chapter III, the CCP outline and other educational regulations 
for implementation on patriotic education have called upon all social sectors, 
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 Students holding the first point of views are 2 senior high students from Shenzhen. They are both 
majoring in physics and thus may pay less attention to the history classes. Students holding the second 
point of views are 4 students from Nanjing. Students in Nanjing, as Li and Shi’ s survey with 1000 
college students in Nanjing revealed, know more about Nanjing massacre and other historical events 
concerning Japan’s invasion in modern China than students from other cities. See Li and Shi (2005).    
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especially primary and secondary schools, to create a lively atmosphere of patriotism. 
Thus, a plethora of extracurricular activities have been carried out in primary and 
secondary schools in China. Among those activities, watching documentaries and 
movies related to wartime history and visiting patriotic education bases (which are 
usually museums and memorial halls) concerning Japan’s invasion in modern China 
are two major and important ones which are supposed to provoke students’ 
anti-Japanese sentiments towards Japan. To examine the effects of schooling through 
those extra-curricular activities, I thus asked students about their participations in 
these extra-curriculum activities. As Figure 4.12 shows, most of students have 
watched movies or documentaries relevant to Japan’s invasion in modern China 
(72.4%), while nearly half of the students said that they have pay site visits to those 
patriotic education bases pertaining to Japan’s aggression in China (40.4%). This 
suggests that students to some degree do participate in these school-organized 
activities, though students’ participations in site visits are generally lower than their 
participations in watching movies and documentaries.80 
 
Figure 4. 12. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized 
by schools? 
 Yes (%) No (%) Total (%) 
1. Watching movies, TV programs or 
documentaries relevant to Japanese 
aggressions in modern China   
72.4 
 
27.6 
 
100 (N
＊
=642) 
2. Visiting patriotic education bases 
pertaining to Japanese aggressions in 
modern China 
40.4 
 
59.6 
 
100 (N=634) 
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents. 
 
Having participating in those extra-curricular activities, what patriotic lessons 
have students learnt? As was discussed earlier, a scale was further posed to measure 
students’ attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and the wartime history. According to 
Figure 4.7, Chinese students, though agreed that Japanese militaries are cruel (89%), 
they did not really think that Chinese should hate Japanese (46.7%, as highlighted in 
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 Students’ participations in site visits depend on the historical background of the cities. Much more 
of the students from Nanjing and Shenyang have participated in site visits since Nanjing and 
Shenyang are two cities with more patriotic education bases related to Japan. See Survey Results in 
Appendix II.       
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Figure 4.7). Most of them, however, would rather like to take Chinese and Japanese 
people as both victims of the wars (62.9%). Chinese students were definitely 
patriotic in the sense that most of them felt deeply empathetic to their Chinese 
fellows who suffered from and died in the wars (84.8%) and responsible for reviving 
Chinese nation (85.9%). Chinese students, however, would like to settle down the 
historical disputes with Japan in a peaceful way and agreed to take history as 
guidance and look into the future (75.9%). Moreover, Chinese students who voted 
for a love for peace and a fight against wars ranked the highest (92.2%), which 
clearly suggests that Chinese students nowadays do not bear narrow or radical 
nationalism as it is usually assumed.  
    These survey results are further supported by my own visits to two of the largest 
patriotic education bases -- the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance 
Against Japanese Aggression located near Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) in Beijing 
and the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders built 
on the historical battlefields in Nanjing. In these two historical sites where strong 
anti-Japanese sentiments are supposed to be provoked, I am surprised to find out that 
there are actually more striking banners glorifying Chinese people’s great resistance 
against the foreign invaders and calling for love for Chinese motherland and world 
peace than anti-Japanese rhetoric. Both museums, as could be perceived from their 
names, were certainly built for memorializing the traumatic wartime history. Thus, 
important historical events are presented in details with words, vivid pictures and 
different kinds of touching approaches in the museums. However, with the historical 
details, the museums do not actually aim at provoking peoples’ hatred and 
nationalistic feelings towards Japan. Rather, an emphasis on China’s triumph in 
Sino-Japanese wars, a call for Chinese love for motherland and world peace, and the 
official discourse, “taking the past as a guide for the future” (yishi weijian), are more 
dominant, especially when it comes to in the conclusion part of the museums (See 
Figure 4.13 ).  
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Figure 4. 13. “Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future” (qianshi buwang, houshi 
zhishi). Photo taken in the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance                                
Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing, January 5, 2011.   
 
 
17
24
109
37
Museum Hall 
Figure 4. 14. Visitor Comments  in 
Museum * and Hall *   
Anti-Japanese Non Anti-Japanese
 
Note: “Museum” means the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance                                
Against Japanese Aggression; “Hall” means the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre 
by Japanese Invaders. 
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As a result, when examining the visitors’ comments in both museums,81 I also 
surprisingly found out that there are more non anti-Japanese comments than 
anti-Japanese comments in both museums (See Figure 4. 14). From the visitors’ 
comments collected, positive comments like “Keeping the national humiliation in 
mind and reviving the Chinese nation” (wuwang guochi, zhenxin zhonghua) and 
“Cherish the peace and fight against wars” (zhenai heping, fandui zhanzheng) are 
more numerous than negative comments such as “All Japanese evils go to the hell” 
(riben guizi sige jingguang) or “Little Japanese deserve one more nuclear bombing” 
(gaigei xiaoriben laiduo yige yuanzidan). From the comments, it is clear that more 
Chinese visitors tend to be sympathetic for their Chinese fellows who died in wars, 
be patriotic to the Chinese motherland, and be appreciative of the present-day peace. 
Not many of them really bear hatred towards Japan, especially towards Japanese 
people. They would criticize, if they do, Japanese militarism, fascism, or the evil of 
war as a whole.            
 
4.5 Conclusion  
    Focusing on the “receivers” of Chinese patriotic education, this chapter mainly 
examines Chinese students’ perceptions of Japan and their reactions to the patriotic 
education through history textbooks and teachers as well as extra-curriculum 
activities in secondary schools. Based on data from my surveys with secondary 
schools students and other surveys with college students as well as general Chinese 
populace, it is firstly found out that different from, if not contrary to, the 
widely-accepted idea that Chinese youths are anti-Japanese, Chinese youths 
nowadays in fact tend to perceive Japan in a multi-faceted and rational way. Having 
grown up in a more open Chinese society with different sources of information about 
Japan, Chinese youths are better informed and more politically and ideologically 
independent. They thus have a more liberal understanding of Japan as well as the 
patriotic education in schools. It is then found out that the reactions of the “receivers” 
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 Both museums allow visitors to leave comments on the museums as well as their personal feelings 
after their visits. By collected the latest parts of the comments which were left by the most recent 
visitors and were available for reference, I totally collected 61 pieces of comments from the Memorial 
Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, and 126 pieces of comments from the 
Museum of the War of Chinese People`s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Based on the 
general ideas and the wordings of the comments, I further divide the comments into two categories – 
“anti-Japanese” and “non anti-Japanese.”For the results of the content analysis, see Figure 4.14.  
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do matter in deciding the effects of schooling, and due to the bigger influences from 
the Internet and other mass media as well as the problems within the schooling 
structure and actors (in this case, the “resistance” of the teachers and students to the 
intended curriculum), Chinese patriotic education in schools seems to play a less 
important and effective role in forming students’ perceptions of Japan, especially 
their negative perceptions of Japan.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1. A more genuine picture   
The politics over the content of history textbooks has triggered the “memory 
wars” between China and Japan since the early 1980s. Critics and public attentions 
have for so long focused on history textbooks and the negative impacts of history 
textbooks on both Chinese and Japanese people’s understanding of the wartime 
history and the bilateral relations. This study, however, based on its empirical 
examinations on Chinese textbook materials and secondary school students, has come 
to suggest the weak effects of Chinese patriotic history education on Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan.   
In today’s China, which is characterized by new academic journals, gradually 
more liberalized news media, rapid growth of Internet, and a more globalized, 
developed and informed citizenry, it has been much more difficult for the state to 
impose a single version of the nationalist truth (Zhao 2006). It is therefore no longer 
possible for the party-state to cultivate Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan (or any 
other countries) simply through its political-ideological education in schools as well.   
While schools have been taken as one of the most controllable and important 
socialization agent, the theory of totality suggested by Giroux (1983: 344) has pointed 
out that schools do not exist in a political and social vacuum. Instead, “schools would 
be analyzed, both historically and sociologically, in regard to their interconnections 
with other economic and political institutions” (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 344). 
The theory of totality also stresses the complex relationship between schools and the 
dominant society as well as the active nature of resistance in human beings. It believes 
that neither students nor teachers resemble the “social puppets” and both teachers and 
students demonstrate forms of resistance to the “hegemonic” contexts in the intended 
curriculum (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349). In this way, to what extent the 
intended curriculum is implemented and received actually depends on the interactions 
among different socialization agents, the interconnections among different 
components within each agent, and most importantly, students’ reactions to the 
schooling.  
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This study, thus, by surveying the secondary school students from 8 Chinese 
mainland cities about their reactions to the patriotic history schooling, has revealed 
that in the case of contemporary China, Chinese youths nowadays, who are better 
informed and with a more liberal mind-set, are no longer good followers and listeners 
of the political-ideological curriculum in schools. Their understandings of Japan and 
Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the history narrative of 
Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum. They, instead, tend to resist the 
message which is likely to be embedded with political-ideological indoctrination. 
With stronger influences from the Internet and other mass media and the conflicting 
effects of textbooks and teachers, Chinese youths in fact do not well “digest” the 
information from schools.  
Therefore, this study makes a strong case to scrutinize the acuities of “receivers” 
in the analysis of school history education’s impact on peoples’ understanding of 
history, rejecting the simplified assumptions of “creator-receiver connections” and 
providing a more genuine picture of the formation process of Chinese youths’ 
perceptions of Japan and the mechanism on how Chinese patriotic education affects 
the formation process (See below).  
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5.2. “Confident nationalism” 
Born in 1980s and 1990s when both economic and cultural exchanges have been 
boosted between China and Japan, Chinese youths have grown up with access to all 
kinds of Japanese products, fashions and popular cultures, although on the other hand 
they have learned about Japanese invasions in modern China from schools and 
witnessed the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations with their own eyes in the past 
decades. With such living experience, Chinese youths nowadays, as my survey results 
have shown, tend to have multi-faceted rather than dichotomous perceptions of Japan. 
As aforementioned, with more liberal mind-set and being better informed, Chinese 
youths seem also more politically and ideologically independent and thus manage to 
perceive the outside world, including Japan who was once the most brutal invader in 
China during wartime, with more reasonable and pragmatic rationality but less 
emotional and exclusionary nationalism.  
In today’s China, which has been undergoing the Reform and Opening-up policy 
with globalization for over 30 years, Chinese youths have also witnessed the rapid 
growth and the great reform of Chinese society in the past few decades.  Although 
they have been taught the history about the “humiliation century” in schools, they 
have been living far away from wartime and instead being taught to cherish the peace 
and be prepared for the globalization. Chinese youths, therefore, as some scholars 
recently observe, tend to have more “confident nationalism.”82 It is also suggested that 
the pre-existing Chinese “traumatic nationalism” which was rooted in its “national 
humiliation” and supposed to be vengeful and exclusionary seems to be fading away, 
or at least, is no longer that obvious among Chinese youths (Friedman 2010; Lewis 
2010).    
According to Daniel Bell (2008: 2), who has been teaching political theory at 
Tsinghua University in Beijing and has a chance to closely observe Chinese youths, 
“As China rises to great power status, it seems more obvious that Chinese patriotism 
and nationalism, especially those among Chinese youths, tend to base their national 
pride and confidence on China’s recent developments and Chinese traditional culture 
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Michel Oksenbeg (1986) used “confident nationalism” to describe Chinese nationalism after Deng’s 
Open and Reform policy in 1980s and characterized by openness to international ideas in the 
economic sphere, confidence in the resiliency of Chinese culture and ongoing rhetorical opposition to 
the West as the primary means of national identification. Also see Bell (2008).  
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rather than the national traumas and the psychology of ‘being victimized’… Some 
Chinese students nowadays become “nationalistic” in the sense of being committed to 
learning more about Chinese culture and philosophy… In fact, Chinese students today 
commonly believe that any stable and legitimate political arrangement needs to be 
founded, at least partly, on political ideas from their own tradition.”       
Despite the growing social and economic inequality and more widely known 
official corruption in current Chinese society, many Chinese, not only Chinese youths, 
seem quite confident in China’s further developments and the way in which China is 
developing. Based on the Pew Research Center’s most recent global survey on 
peoples’ outlook on the economy growth of their own countries, China is one of the 
emerging economies where the people have more positive economic outlook of their 
country and more trust in their economic model.83 Being aware of the complexity of 
the domestic and international problems China is facing, Chinese youths today, 
however, no longer think that there is “one catch-all solution” and even become 
“apologists” for the government especially when “the ill-informed foreigners start to 
bash their countries” (Bell 2008: 2).   
With its economic success, social stability and gradual political reform in the 
past three decades, the CCP government has indeed won widespread support from its 
peoples (Lewis 2010, 10). Despite there have been critical voices rising up across the 
nation through different approaches, and for long there have been both international 
and domestic critics of the CCP government’s oppressions over the critical voices 
within China, the CCP government so far has successfully avoided another massive 
anti-government movements and won over the satisfaction and confidence from most 
of Chinese public. In order to build up Chinese populace’s confidence and trust in its 
ruling, the CCP government has in fact shifted its post-1989 “patriotic education 
campaign” emphasizing the “humiliation century” to the new state propaganda 
focusing on “great achievements under the Reform and Opening-up Policy of the 
CCP.” (Lewis 2010)   
Such a shift in official propaganda has been clearly seen from many aspects of 
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 See” Pervasive Gloom About the World Economy”, Pew Research Center, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/12/pervasive-gloom-about-the-world-economy/?utm_source=Perv
asive+Gloom+About+the+World+Economy&utm_campaign=Economic+Conditions&utm_medium=e
mail, firstly accessed on July 13, 2012.  
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the recent changing Chinese society. First and foremost, the changes of the 
ideological-political discourse in school curriculum, as revealed earlier in this study, 
are obviously seen through the more balanced introductions and more equal 
treatments to Chinese ancient, modern and contemporary history and world history in 
the reformed history curriculum for secondary schools since 2001. These changes in 
historical narratives – if they are not a coincidence – could be viewed as a sign of the 
CCP government’s new efforts to build up people’s confidence in the party-state 
through promoting their national pride based on the great achievements in the past 
three decades, their national identity originated from Chinese traditional culture and 
their balanced and peaceful view of the outside world.   
Besides, it is clear that the evolving nature of Chinese state propaganda was best 
seen in 2008, the year when the worst snowstorm in 50 years hit China in January, 
followed by Tibetan unrest in March, 8.0-magnitude Sichuan Earthquake in May, the 
Torch Relay through April to July, the Beijing Olympics in August and finally the 
worldwide financial crisis starting in late-2008 (Barme 2009; Brady 2009). All these 
“natural calamities and man-made misfortunes” (tianzai renhuo) as well as the great 
success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 have called upon Chinese national unity and 
identity, raising high Chinese “confident nationalism” and building up a new source 
for the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority.  
The successfully holding major international events, such as the Beijing 
Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, thus have been important to 
promote Chinese “confident nationalism.” Those international events are important 
not only in the sense that those events provides important opportunities to present 
China as a modern, confident and responsible power, but also in the sense that in order 
to succeed in holding these international event, Chinese are required to be more 
open-minded, tolerant and respectful to other cultures and nations while being 
confident in Chinese culture and nationality. A number of innocuous slogans such as 
“One World, One Dream” [yige shijie, yige mengxiang] and “Be Civilized and Follow 
the New Trends” [jiang wenming, shu xinfeng], thus have encouraged citizens to 
integrate notions of China’s national greatness with its objectives of re-vamping 
China’s image abroad (Barme 2009).  
In this “post-Olympics” era, if China’s rising indeed leads Chinese to have 
“confident nationalism” instead of “assertive nationalism” as is often assumed, 
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China’s rising will certainly serve as a positive factor contributing to both world peace 
and regional stability. It will also point to a better relationship between China and 
Japan since with “confident nationalism,” it is possible for Chinese, especially 
Chinese youths, to be patriotic while being confident and tolerant, but without being 
antagonistic towards other countries, including Japan.  
 
5.3 Further Discussions   
5.3.1 Limitations  
Although this study intends to address the effects of Chinese patriotic education 
and Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan in a broader sense, it principally focuses on 
the patriotic history curriculum and students in secondary schools of major cities in 
Mainland China. The narrowing down of the research subjects, though it could be 
justified in theory and compensated by additional second-hand data, suffers from an 
insufficient coverage of the whole population. The patriotic education curriculum 
embedded in other classes, such as politics and geography classes, for instance, are not 
addressed in this study.84
 
Furthermore, college education which is also involved with a 
noticeable patriotic education curriculum is not covered in this study either, while 
students in rural China, who may have significant variances from students in big cities, 
are also not intentionally sampled in both my questionnaire survey and in-depth 
interviews (though some of my respondents once lived in rural areas). Therefore, it 
may be problematic to generalize the empirical findings of this study into the whole 
population of Chinese youths and the effects of Chinese patriotic education in different 
levels.  
Also, the foregoing analysis was largely based on the cross-sectional survey data 
collected at certain points in time – January 2011 for most in-depth interviews and 
early June 2011 for questionnaire survey, which closely followed the ship collision 
disputes between China and Japan in the late 2010 and the magnitude-9.0 earthquake, 
deadly tsunami and Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan on March 2011. We thus must 
acknowledge that the survey data from both in-depth interviews and questionnaire 
survey are more or less affected by those events. Although the effects of these two 
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 From my survey with secondary school students, it is found that students also learn knowledge 
about Japan from other courses, such as geography, politics and foreign language classes. For survey 
results, see Q 9 in Appendix II.       
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events on Chinese perceptions of Japan might seem to cancel one another out since the 
Chinese reaction to the boat collision was generally one of hostility or anger while their 
reaction to the March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown 
tended to be one of sympathy and compassion, these contingent events may somehow 
lead to certain levels of instant fluctuations of respondents’ attitudes towards Japan.  
What is more, recent media discussions over the bilateral disputes and official 
interactions between two governments may also affect students’ opinions on relevant 
issues and the bilateral relations. Even though most the bilateral disputes have 
remained problems in the background of Sino-Japanese relations, it is undeniable that 
the most recent disputes (such as the textbook and territorial disputes) which are 
brought to the forefront are more fresh and vivid in students’ minds and thus may tend 
to arouse students’ emotional sentiments towards the issues, while disputes which are 
fading away and recently less discussed (for example, disputes over Japanese PM’s 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine) may be beyond students’ knowledge and attention and thus 
lead students to care less or have cooler thinking of the issues.85
 
 
Hidden effects may also be brought by the possible political sensitivity of this 
research topic in China’s context and particularly in the school circumstances where the 
surveys were mainly conducted. With the supervision of the teachers, who were 
questionnaire distributors, in classrooms, students tend to be more aware of the 
censorship and official propaganda as well as the political sensitivity of the topic. 
Although the principle of anonymity has been always emphasized before the interviews 
and questionnaire survey, students may still be reluctant to tell their true feelings 
especially when they were asked to evaluate their perceptions of Japan and the impacts 
of school education and their teachers. So were those students and teachers in my 
in-depth interviews. Therefore, we must keep it in mind that the Chinese political 
culture and the relationships between students and teachers – respondents and 
questionnaire distributors in our survey – may to some degree diminish the validity of 
the respondents’ response to both the questionnaire and interviews.  
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 However, in the sense that most the disputes between China and Japan are supposed to be taught 
and discussed in school classes, family, and other occasions. Students’ knowledge about the disputes 
may not necessarily affected by the recent media discussions and official interactions.  
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5.3.2. Practical propose based on further survey findings      
While revealing the relatively weak effects of Chinese patriotic education on 
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan, this study finds out students’ knowledge about 
Japan and the friendly exchanges between China and Japan positively correlates with 
students’ perceptions of Japan (See Figure 5.1.).  
 
Figure 5.1. Correlations between Knowledge about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations 
and Students’ Perceptions of Japan. (Pearson's Correlation) 
Level of knowledge of Japan Perceptions of Japan 
1. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products 0.305** (N=640) 
2. Japanese traditional culture 0.257** (N=638) 
3. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and 
numerous earthquakes 
0.147** (N=635) 
4. Japanese emperors 0.172** (N=638) 
5. Meiji Restoration 0.109** (N=639) 
6. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time 0.219** (N=637) 
7. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China 0.238** (N=640) 
8. Japan's aggression in modern China 0.034 (N=628) 
9. Historical disputes between China and Japan 0.038(N=639) 
10. Territorial disputes between China and Japan 0.010 (N=639) 
Notes:  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
Moreover, by dividing the 8 cities where the survey was undertaken into two 
groups—Shenyang, Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen as cities which have 
more contacts with Japan due to economic and historical reasons (for short, “exchange 
developed cities”), and Wuhan, Changsha and Chongqing as cities which have fewer 
contacts with Japan for geographic and economic reasons (for short, “exchange 
undeveloped cities”), it is found that students from these two groups of cities have 
significantly different perceptions of Japan.86 It is further found that students from 
those “exchange developed cities” overall have better perceptions of Japan than 
students from those “exchange undeveloped cities”.87 It is thus clear that exchanges 
with Japan also positively correlates with students’ perceptions of Japan. Bilateral 
exchanges at all levels, especially among youths, are no doubt the key to improve 
students’ perceptions of Japan and the bilateral relations.       
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 An Independent sample test was conducted to compare the perceptions of students from these two 
groups of cities. t (4.88) =638, p=0.000.   
87
 By comparing the means of students’ perceptions of Japan from these two groups, the mean of 
students’ perceptions of Japan from “exchange developed cities” (M=5.69, SD=1.954) is higher than 
the mean of students’ perceptions of Japan from “exchange undeveloped cities” (M=4.94,SD=2.082).  
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Unfortunately, as my survey and previous public opinion polls have also revealed, 
personal experiences are playing the least important role as an information source 
about Japan for Chinese students (1.9%, see Figure 4.11). 88 This result may be 
largely caused by the lack of chances for students to have personal exchanges to Japan 
and personal contacts with Japanese people. What is worse, most of the Chinese 
students instead get much of their information about Japan through the Internet and 
other mass media where there may be more bias and political propaganda hidden. As a 
result, it is more likely for Chinese students to develop incomplete – though not 
necessarily negative – views of Japan.  
On Japan’s side, the previous public polls similarly indicated that most of the 
Japanese people also learn information about China through the Internet and Japanese 
mass media.89
 
Due to the recent fact that Japanese perceptions of China have also 
been deteriorating, it is highlighted that the more influential role of mass media and 
the lack of first-hand information in both sides may be one of the main reasons 
contributing to the consistently negative perceptions between Chinese and Japanese 
peoples. Based on these findings, this study thus suggests the necessity and very 
importance to encourage mutual exchanges between Chinese and Japanese peoples, 
especially among youths. Without doubts, only with more first-hand knowledge based 
on personal experience, can two peoples have more comprehensive and deeper 
understanding of each other.  
Finally, although this study emphasizes that the underlying power of the patriotic 
history education in Chinese schools is less vigorous than assumed, it is noted that this 
does not mean that the study overlooks “the power of silence” in history education. As 
Muller (2011: 52) suggested, “in any case, without building up more trust, which 
cannot be torpedoed by history education stressing insurmountable differences, a 
regional integration is hardly possible.” Thus, the efforts to address the bilateral 
disputes over history education between Chinese and Japanese governments and 
academia are of great importance though so far they have not yet achieved much 
consensus and still have to be developed. Sino-Japanese relations are the key to the 
regional stability in Asia and the world peace. It therefore deserves the joint and 
long-term efforts from governments, academia and peoples.  
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 Also see survey results on Q7Appendix II.   
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 China Daily and Japanese Genron NPO (2005 -2011), Ibid.   
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Appendix 1  
(Structured schedule of interviews with students)   
 
Interviewees: secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing 
Methods and language: face-to-face and online interviews in Chinese (mandarin).    
Duration: no time limit.  
 
[The start of the interview] 
Q1. At the mere mention of Japan, what is the first thing you think of?  
Q2. How do you perceive Japan?  
Q3. What do you know about Japan?  
Q4. Where do you learn the above information from about Japan?  
Q5. Do you know the history about Japan’s invasion in China in the past? Could you 
raise some examples?  
Q6. Where do you learn the history about Japan’s invasion of China in the past?   
Q7. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned the history about 
Japan’s invasion of China in the past?  
Q8. Do you know about Japan’s attempts to revise its history textbooks after the 
WWII? Where did you learn this?  
Q9. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japan’s 
attempts to revise its history textbooks?  
Q10. Do you know about Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine? 
Should the Japanese Prime Minister visit Yasukuni Shrine?  
Q11. Where did you learn about Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine? 
Q12. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japanese 
Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine?  
Q13. What have you been taught about Japan in school classes?  
Q14. During which schooling period did you (learn) knowledge about Japan?  
Q15. Have you watched any movies or documentaries on Japan’s invasion of China 
during wartime in classes? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these 
movies and documentaries?  
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Q16. Have you participated in any school-organized extra-curricular activities, such 
as visiting museums or memorial halls pertaining to Japan’s invasion in China 
during wartime? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these 
extra-curricular activities?   
Q17. What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of Japan 
or the positive ones?  
Q18. Are school classes the most important source for you to learn about Japan? If 
no, what is your most important source for information about Japan?   
[The end of the interview] 
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Appendix 2  
(Questionnaire (English) and Aggregated Survey Results) 
Note: 1. The survey was carried out in early June 2011 with secondary schools 
students from 9 cities of Mainland China – Shenyang, Xi’an, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing, Shenzhen – where 
anti-Japanese protests had taken place in 1996 and 2005. However, as the 
sample of Xi’an was removed from the total sample, the survey data of the 
other 8 cities was analyzed. With a response rate of 89.3%, 643 valid 
cases with complete responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are 
cases from Beijing, 73 from Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from 
Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72 
from Wuhan. 
2.  N is for the number of valid cases.  
.  
 
Q1. Which grade are you currently in? (N=642, %) 
 
A. Year 1 in junior high school            18.1 
B. Year 2 in junior high school            18.1 
C. Year 3 in junior high school            13.2 
D. Year 1 in senior high school            19.9 
E. Year 2 in senior high school            17.2 
F. Year 3 in senior high school            13.1 
 
Q2. Have you been studying in the city where you are currently living in? 
(N= 641, %) 
 
A. Yes                               91.0  
B. No                                9.0  
C. Others                               0  
 
Q3. Given a chance to visit Japan, would you like to go? (N=642, %) 
 
A. Yes (continue to answer Q4)            72.3 
B. No                                 22.7 
C. Others                               5.0                      
 
Q4. For what purpose would you like to visit Japan?  (N=503, %) 
 
A. Travel and shopping                       39.2  
B. Further education                         11.1 
C. Understand Japanese culture and society       43.3  
D. Make Japanese friends                      2.2  
E. Others                                   4.2  
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Q5. How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations? 
 
 Know 
Very 
Well 
(%) 
Know 
(%) 
Somewhat 
Know  
(%) 
Know 
Very 
Little  
(%) 
Don’t 
Know at 
All (%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese 
modern culture 
and Japanese 
products 
16.0 
 
28.0 48.4 6.4 1.2 100 
(N=643) 
2. Japanese 
traditional 
culture 
8.6 
 
24.5 46.5 17.0 3.4 100 
(N=642) 
3. Japan as an 
island country 
with limited 
natural 
resources and 
numerous 
earthquakes 
27.7 
 
39.5 26.0 4.2 2.5 100 
(N=638) 
4. Japanese 
emperors 
9.2 
 
25.4 35.7 23.6 6.1 100 
(N=641) 
5. Meiji 
Restoration 
15.9 
 
26.8 31.3 18.8 7.2 100 
(N=642) 
6. Friendly 
exchanges 
between China 
and Japan in 
ancient time 
29.1 
 
32.3 26.2 9.2 3.1 100 
(N=640) 
7. Japanese 
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
(ODA) in 
China 
3.0 9.3 26.1 44.0 17.6 100 
(N=643) 
8. Japan's 
aggression in 
modern China 
54.4 
 
25.8 13.8 4.1 1.9 100 
(N=631) 
9. Historical 
disputes 
between China 
and Japan 
24.1 22.9 25.1 19.6 8.3 100 
(N=642) 
10. Territorial 
disputes 
between China 
and Japan 
38.3 33.0 21.0 5.9 1.7 100 
(N=642) 
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Q6. Which of the following aspects about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations 
is most impressive to you? (N = 641, %) 
 
Q7. What is the most important approach for you to learn about Japan? 
(N=640, %) 
 
A. School education (i.e. classes, textbooks, extracurricular activities in schools, etc.)   22.0  
B. Internet, TV programs, newspapers, and other mass media.                      69.4  
C. Experiences of families, relatives and friends.                                 2.7  
D. Personal experiences                                                     1.9  
E. Others                                                                 4.1  
 
Q8. In which period have you learnt most knowledge about Japan?  
 
 
Q9. Through which of the following school classes have you learnt knowledge 
about Japan? (Multiple Answers, N=643, %)  
 
A. History class                                  91.6  
B. Geography class                               58.0 
C. Politics class                                  18.8  
D. Chinese class                                  18.2 
E. Foreign languages class                          4.7  
F. Moral cultivation class                           4.7  
G. Society and sciences class                        3.9  
H. Military theory class                             2.2  
I. Others                                        0.9  
 
A. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products                              41.5  
B. Japanese traditional culture                                                7.8  
C. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes   7.5 
D. Japanese emperors                                                       1.1  
E. Meiji Restoration                                                        1.1  
F. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time                     1.4  
G. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China                      0  
H. Japan's aggression in modern China                                         30.6  
I. Historical disputes between China and Japan                                   0.5 
J. Territorial disputes between China and Japan                                  2.7 
K. Others                                                                5.9 
Schooling  
Period 
Junior High School Students  
(N=317, %) 
Senior High School Students 
 (N=325, %) 
A. Pre-schooling  0.6 0.9 
B. Primary School 12.6 3.7 
C. Junior High School 83.0 45.2 
D. Senior High School -- 46.2 
E. Others 3.8 0.4 
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Q10. What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of 
Japan or the positive ones? (N=640, %) 
 
A. The positive aspects                                   8.1  
B. Equal                                              67.5  
C. The negative aspects                                  22.2  
D. Not sure                                             2.2 
 
Q11. Do you think that what you have learnt about Japan from schools is 
consistent with what you learnt about Japan out of schools? (N=634, %) 
 
A. Yes                                                32.2 
B. Some yes, some no                                    61.0  
C. No                                                 3.3 
D. Not sure                                             3.5  
 
Q 12. How did your perceptions of Japan change due to textbooks\ teachers? 
 
 Worsened 
(%) 
Remained 
the same 
(%) 
Improved 
(%) 
Not Sure 
 (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Textbooks 35.0 43.1 17.4 4.5 100 (N=638) 
Teachers 24.0 47.4 24.2 4.4 100 (N=633) 
 
 
Q13. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized by 
schools? (By city) 
 
 
 
Watch movie or documentary 
about Japan's aggression in 
modern China (%) 
Visit museum or memorial hall about 
Japan's aggression in modern China 
(%) 
Beijing Not 16.9 55.4 
 
Yes 83.1 44.6 
 
Total 100 (N=65) 100 (N=65) 
Chongqing Not 28.8 76.4 
 
Yes 71.2 23.6 
 
Total 100 (N=73) 100 (N=72) 
Changsha Not 21.5 62.8 
 
Yes 78.5 37.2 
 
Total 100 (N=79) 100 (N=78) 
Nanjing Not 24.1 21.8 
 
Yes 75.9 78.2 
 
Total 100 (N=87) 100 (N=87) 
Shanghai Not 35.6 65.5 
 
Yes 64.4 34.5 
 
Total 100 (N=87) 100 (N=87) 
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Shenyang Not 30 39.5 
 
Yes 70 60.5 
 
Total 100 (N=90) 100 (N=86) 
Shenzhen Not 26.1 73 
 
Yes 73.9 27 
 
Total 100 (N=88) 100 (N=86) 
Wuhan Not 36.1 90 
 
Yes 63.9 10 
 
Total 100 (N=72) 100 (N=70) 
 
Q14. Do you agree the following statements after watching 
movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to 
Japanese aggression in China during wartime? 
 
 Strongl
y Agree 
(%) 
Agr
ee 
(%) 
Neutr
al  
(%) 
Disagre
e (%) 
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e (%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese 
militaries were 
cruel. 
61.4 
 
27.4 9.0 1.4 0.2 0.4 100  
(N=511) 
2. Chinese soldiers 
were great. 
53.2 
 
24.1 14.9 4.3 1.6 2.0 100  
(N=511) 
3. The Chinese 
should hate the 
Japanese.  
24.2 
 
23.4 34.8 14.1 1.6 2.0 100  
(N=509) 
4. Chinese fellows 
who victimized in 
the wars should be 
mourned forever. 
61.5 23.3 11.4 3.2 0.4 0.2 100  
(N=507) 
5. Both the Chinese 
and Japanese 
peoples were 
victims in the wars. 
38.1 24.8 21.0 10.2 4.1 1.8 100  
(N=509) 
6. Take history as 
guidance and look 
into the future. 
51.3 24. 
6 
17.5 5.3 0.4 1.0 100  
(N=509) 
7. Love Chinese 
motherland and 
revive Chinese 
nation.  
68.5 17.4 12.5 1.4 0.2 0 100  
(N=511) 
8. Love peace and 
fight against the 
wars.  
81.4 10.8 6.1 0.8 0.4 0.6 100  
(N=511) 
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Q15. To what extent, if any, do you dislike Japan in terms of the following 
controversial issues between China and Japan? 
 
 
Q16. Given permissions to demonstrate in China, will you attend the legal 
demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and 
Japan?  
 
 Yes (%) No (%) Not Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese right-wingers’ 
revisions of history 
textbooks 
55.6 
 
40.2 
 
4.2 
 
    100 (N=639)        
 
2.Japanese prime ministers’  
visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
38.4 
 
58.7 
 
2.8 
 
   100 (N=635) 
3.Japan’s competition with 
China over the sovereignty 
of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
and East China Sea 
60.5 
 
35.8 
 
3.8 
 
   100 (N=640) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly 
Dislike 
(%) 
Dislik
e 
(%) 
Somewha
t Dislike  
(%) 
Slight
ly 
Dislik
e (%) 
Don’t 
Dislik
e at 
All 
(%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1. Japanese 
aggression in 
China during 
wartime 
75.1 18.0 5.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 100 
(N=643
) 
2. Japanese 
right-wingers’ 
revisions of 
history textbooks 
69.6 17.0 
 
8.7 
   
2.6 0 2.0 
 
100  
(N=642
) 
3.Japanese prime 
ministers’  
visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine 
45.3 24.8 
 
13.0 9.8 
 
1.1 
 
5.9 
 
100  
(N=640
) 
4. Japan’s 
competition with 
China over the 
sovereignty of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Island and East 
China Sea 
65.3 
 
22.9 
 
9.0 
 
1.2 
 
0.5 
 
1.1 
 
100 
(N=643
) 
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Q17. Do you agree with the following statements about Japanese? 
 Strongl
y Agree 
(%) 
Agr
ee 
(%) 
Neutr
al 
 (%) 
Disagre
e (%) 
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e (%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Japanese are polite 27.7 39.2 
 
22.7 
 
3.6 
 
5.0 
 
1.9 100 
(N=643
) 
Japanese are 
responsible 
29.9 
 
40.9 
 
21.0 
 
2.5 
 
3.4 
 
2.3 
 
100 
(N=643
) 
Japanese are disciplined 34.5 
 
34.6 
 
20.0 
 
3.9 
 
4.4 
 
2.7 
 
100 
(N=641
) 
Japanese are impenitent 27.0 
 
18.6 
 
32.0 
 
14.4 
 
3.7 
 
4.4 
 
100 
(N=641
) 
Japanese are arrogant 27.8 
 
20.7 
 
30.7 
 
13.3 
 
3.7 
 
3.7 100 
(N=641
) 
Japanese are agressive 44.9 23.7 20.6 5.5 2.8 2.
5 
100 
(N=641
) 
 
Q18. What perceptions do you have of Japan? (N=640) 
 
Degree Value Percent (%) 
Very Unfavorable 9.9  
 1 6.1 
 2  3.8  
Unfavorable 12.3 
 3 6.1  
 4 6.2 
Moderate   52.2  
 5 25.0  
 6 27.2  
Favorable   20.4  
 7 10.6  
 8 9.8  
Very Favorable 4.7  
 9 2.2  
 10 2.5  
Not sure   0.5 
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Appendix 3  
(Original Questionnaire in Chinese) 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
问卷编号：  
 
 
 
问卷调查说明 
 
此问卷调查出于本人硕士论文研究的需要，主要目的在于收集有关中学生对
日本的整体认知，以及其认知是否来源于学校教育的数据。 
问卷调查采取随机抽样获得样本，答卷人以自愿原则参与。问卷内容主要涉
及答卷人的个人观点和学习经历，不涉及任何与学校和答卷人有关的私人信息。
本人将严格按照问卷调查的有关要求，妥善处理、保管问卷和有关数据，尊重并
维护有关学校和问卷参与者的相关权利。 
   此问卷包括封面和结语共五页，其中问卷主体题目 18 道，结语附有信息题目
4 道。正常答卷时间约为 10-15 分钟。  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
问卷制作人： 吴泽映 
学习单位：香港岭南大学政治学系 
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说明：请仔细阅读以下问题和相关指示，用圆圈标出适合的选项的编号并填写相关答
案。  
 
1. 你目前就读哪个年级？ 
A. 初中一年级     B. 初中二年级     C. 初中三年级  
D. 高中一年级    E. 高中二年级     F. 高中三年级 
 
2. 你一直都在目前所在的城市上学吗？ 
A. 是   （到目前为止有几年:  __________年）     
B. 不是 （请说明最近两处曾经上过学的地方：_______省_______市________县/
村;  _______省_______市________县/村） 
 
3. 如果有机会让你去日本，你愿意去吗？  
A． 愿意  
B． 不愿意 （无需回答问题 4） 
C． 其他 （请说明：____________________________________） 
 
4. 你去日本最主要出于什么目的？（单选）  
A. 游玩和购物 
B. 留学深造 
C. 认识和体验日本文化 
D. 与日本人交流 
E. 其他 （请说明：______________________________________） 
 
5. 你对以下有关日本的知识了解有多少？ (请圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你对相应
知识的了解程度。) 
 非常 
了解 
了
解 
一般
了解 
不了
解 
非常不
了解 
A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本
漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、
歌舞伎、相扑等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、
资源贫乏、地震多发等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、
社会等级观念较强等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新
等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
F. 日本近代侵华的历史。 5 4 3 2 1 
G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交
往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。 
5 4 3 2 1 
H. 日本战后通过政府发展援助计划
（ODA）援助中国经济发展。 
5 4 3 2 1 
I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科
书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。 
5 4 3 2 1 
J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛
问题。 
5 4 3 2 1 
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6. 你对日本的印象最主要是根据你对日本哪方面知识的了解？（单选） 
A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。 
B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、歌舞伎、相扑等。  
C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、资源贫乏、地震多发等。  
D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、社会等级观念较强等。 
E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新等。 
F. 日本近代侵华的历史。 
G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。   
H. 日本战后通过政府发展援助计划（ODA）援助中国经济发展。 
I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。 
J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛问题。 
K. 其他 （请说明：________________________________________） 
 
7. 你最主要是通过哪一途径了解到这一方面的信息的？ （单选） 
A. 课本教材、课堂和学校组织的课外活动。 
B. 网络、电视、报纸和各种课外书籍杂志。 
C. 家人、亲戚或朋友的经历和见闻。 
D. 自己的亲身经历和见闻。 
E. 其他（请说明：__________________________________________） 
 
8. 你在以下哪个阶段接收到了最多有关日本的知识？ （单选） 
A. 学前教育      B. 小学      C. 初中       D. 高中     
F. 其他 （请说明：_____________________）  
 
9. 你在学校的哪些课堂上接收到了有关日本的知识？（可多选） 
A. 历史课  B. 地理课  C. 政治课  D. 语文课  E. 外语课  F. 思想品德课 G. 
社会与科学  H. 军事理论课 I. 其他 （请说明：_______） 
 
10. 你觉得你在学校课堂上接收到的更多是有关日本正面的知识，还是负面的知识？ 
A. 正面的知识   B. 负面的知识    C. 两者相当       D. 不清楚     
 
11. 你觉得你在学校里接收的有关日本的知识跟你在学校外了解到的一致吗？ 
A. 一致    B. 有些一致，有些不一致   C. 不一致      D. 不清楚 
 
12. 你对日本的印象有没有因为以下两个因素而改变？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字。） 
 有，
变好 
有， 
变差 
没有
变化 
不清
楚 
A. 学校教科书里有关日本的内容。 3 2 1 0 
B. 老师在课堂上对有关日本的知识的
讲解。 
3 2 1 0 
 
13. 你有没有参加过学校或老师组织的以下的课堂活动和课外活动？（请用圆圈标出适
合的数字，并填写有关答案； 若都选择“0”，则无需回答问题 14。） 
 有 没有 若有，请列举一例。  
A. 观看有关日本侵华历史的影片或纪录
片。 
1 0  
B. 参观与日本侵华历史有关的纪念馆。 1 0  
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14. 你看完这些影片或纪录片（或参观完有关的纪念馆）后，有以下哪种感觉？ （请
用圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你相应感觉的强烈程度。）   
 非常
强烈 
强
烈 
一般
强烈 
不强
烈 
非常不
强烈 
没感觉 
A. 日本士兵很残忍。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
B. 中国军人很伟大。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
C. 憎恨日本人。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
D. 缅怀战争中遇难的同
胞。 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
E. 中国人民和日本人民都
是战争的受害者。 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
F. 以史为鉴，面向未来。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
G. 热爱祖国，振兴中国民
族。 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
H. 反对战争，热爱和平。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
15. 你对以下日本方面的行为是否反感？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你的反感程
度。）  
 非常 
反感 
反感 一般 
反感 
不反
感 
非常不 
反感 
不清
楚 
A. 日本近代侵华。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
B. 日本右翼单方面修改历史教
科书。 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
C. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
D. 日本在钓鱼岛和东海油田等
领土主权问题上与中国存在
争议。  
5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
16. 如果允许，你会因为以下的事件参加针对日本的抗议、示威、游行等活动吗？（请
用圆圈标出适合的数字，并填写有关答案。）  
 会 不会 其他 （请说明） 
A. 日本右翼单方面修改历史教科
书。 
1 0  
B. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。 1 0  
C. 日本与中国在钓鱼岛和东海油田
等领土主权问题上爆发冲突。 
1 0  
 
17. 你同意以下的说法吗？（请圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你的认同程度。） 
 非常 
同意 
同意 一般 
同意 
不同
意 
非常 
不同意 
不清楚 
日本人待人礼貌。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
日本人做事认真。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
日本人严守纪律。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
日本人不知悔改。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
日本人狂妄自大。 5 4 3 2 1 0 
日本人有侵略其他民族
的野心。 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
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18. 你对日本这个国家的整体印象如何？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字。）  
非常好 好 一般 不好 非常不好 不清楚 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
结 语 
 
谢谢支持与合作！ 
因本人分析数据的需要，请答卷人在完成答卷后，继续回答以下四个有关个人和
所在学校信息的问题： 
 
1). 你所在学校属公立、私立、还是其他（请说明）？ 
答：  
 
 
2). 你所在学校属非重点中学还是重点中学（请具体说明是国家重点、省重点、还
是市重点）？ 
答：   
 
 
3). 你所在班级属文科班、理科班还是其他（请说明）？  
答： 
 
 
4). 你所在学校采用的历史教科书是由哪个出版社出版？ 
答： 高中： 
     初中： 
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Appendix 4  
 
I. Official Documents on Chinese Ideological-Political Education since 
1980s,  (From the Encyclopedia of Education Law of the People’s 
Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Fa 
Quanshu])  
1. Ministry of Education Opinion on Improving and Strengthening Secondary 
School Political Education Courses (September 12, 1980) [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu 
Gaijin he Jiaqiang Zhongxue Zhengzhi Ke de Yijian]  
2. Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda 
Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on 
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education (July 2, 1983) [Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi 
Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian]  
3. Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of 
Secondary School History and Geography Courses (August 1, 1983) [Jiaoyu 
Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi]  
4. Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the 
‘Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education’ (August 24, 1983) 
[Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan 
Jiaoyu de Yijian] 
5. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming the 
Teaching of Ideological Character and Political Theory Curricula in Schools 
(August 1, 1985) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige Xuexiao Sixiang 
Pinde he Zhengzhi Lilun Kecheng Jiaoxue de Tongzhi]  
6. State Education Commission Notice on Further Expanding the Experiment in 
Reforming Secondary School Ideological and Political Education Courses 
(Extract) (April 22, 1987) [Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda 
Zhongxue Sixiang Zhengzhi Ke Gaige Shiyan de Tongzhi (Jielu)] 
7. Outline on Secondary School Moral Education (Draft) (August 20, 1988) 
[Zhongxue Deyu Dagang (Shixing Gao)] 8. Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Primary and Middle 
School Moral Education Work (December 25, 1988) [Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi] 
8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming and 
Strengthening Primary and Middle School Moral Education Work (December 
25, 1988) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue 
Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi] 
9. State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of 
Ideological and Political Education and Education on National Conditions in 
Primary and Secondary Language, History, Geography, and Other Courses 
(November 8, 1989) [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, Lishi, 
Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he 
Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian] 
10. A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School 
Moral Education Work (April 13, 1990) [Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang 
Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian] 
11. State Education Commission Notice on Implementing the Policy of Strictly 
Instituting a System for Flag Raising in Primary and Secondary Schools 
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According to the ‘People’s Republic of China National Flag Law’ (August 24, 
1990) [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Shixing ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoqi 
Fa’Yange Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Guoqi Zhidu de Tongzhi] 
12. State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developing Patriotic 
Education Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools (April 25, 1991) 
[Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan 
Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian] 
13. Office of the State Education Commission Notice on Primary and Secondary 
School Extracurricular Reading Materials for Education on National 
Conditions (June 1, 1991) [Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu 
Zhongxiaoxue Guoqing Jiaoyu Kewai Yuedu Duwu de Tongzhi] 
14. State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary 
Draft of the ‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and 
Contemporary History and National Conditions’ (August 27, 1991) [Guojia 
Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa ‘Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandaishi 
ji Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao’ (Chugao) de Tongzhi] 
15. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State 
Education Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil 
Administration, Communist Youth League Central Committee, and National 
Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics in the 
Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary 
Traditions (August 28, 1991) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia 
Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang, Guojia Wenwu 
Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming 
Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi] 
16. The Need to Seriously and Earnestly Implement Primary and Secondary 
Education on Flag-Raising Activities (October 17, 1991) [Yao Yansu er 
Renzhende Jinxing Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Qi Huodong de Jiaoyu] 
17. State Education Commission Outline on National Defense Education in 
Primary and Middle Schools (Draft) (February 19, 1992) [Guojia Jiaoyu 
Weiyuanhui Xiaoxue, Chuzhong Guofang Jiaoyu Gangyao (Shixing)]  
18. Opinion on Strengthening “Loving the Hometown” and Patriotic Education 
in Kindergartens (May 5, 1992) [Guanyu Zai Youeryuan Jiaqiang Ai Jiaxiang, 
Ai Zuguo Jiaoyu de Yijian] 
19. Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education (Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee, August 8, 1994) [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi 
Gangyao]  
 
II. Chinese Secondary School Histroy Textbooks and Curricular 
Standards Examined  
1. Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, People’s Education Press, 1985.  
2. 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 3 Nian Zhi Chuji Zhongxue Jiaokeshu: Zhongguo Lishi, 
People’s Education Press, 1995.  
3. Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shiyan Jiaokeshu: Lishi, People’s 
Education Press, 2008.  
4. 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang, 
People’s Education Press, 1992. 
5. 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang, 
People’s Education Press, 2000. 
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6. Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang, People’s Education Press, 1986.  
7. Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun, The Press of Beijing Normal University, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
102 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Appenrodt, Kathleen. 2008. “Public opinion in authoritarian states: Exploring 
the impact of growing anti-Japanese sentiment on Chinese foreign policy 
decision-making.” Conference Papers -- International Studies Association  
Au, Kung-wing. 2008. “The East China Sea issue: Japan-China talks for oil and 
gas.” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 25 (3) (Fall2008): 223-41.  
Barme, Geremie R. 1995. “To screw foreigners is patriotic: China’s avant-garde 
nationalism.” The China Journal, 34: 209-234.  
Bell, Daniel A. 2008. “Chinese students constructive nationalism.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, 54, (48) (Aug 08): B.20-B20.  
Calder, Kent E. 2005. “Re-casting antipathy: The internet, generational change, 
and the Sino-Japanese relationship” Conference Papers -- International 
Studies Association.  
______. 2006. “China and Japan's simmering rivalry.” Foreign Affairs, 85: 
129-139.  
Callahan, William A. 2004. Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational 
Relations. Minneapolis: 
______. 2007. “Trauma and Community: The Visual Politics of Chinese 
Nationalism and Sino-Japanese Relations”, Theory & Event, 10 (4):1-57..  
Carlson, Allen. 2009. "A flawed perspective: the limitations inherent within the 
study of Chinese nationalism." Asian security, 15 (1):20-35. 
Chan, Che-po and Brian Bridges. 2006. “China, Japan, and the clash of 
nationalisms.” Asian Perspective, 30 (1), 127-156.   
Chen, Shengluo. 2003, “Chinese College Students’ Perceptions of Japan 
(Zhongguo Daxuesheng dui Riben de Kanfa),” Youth Studies (Qingnian 
Yanjiu), 11: 22-29. 
Cheng, Joseph Y. S. 1984. “China's Japan policy in the 1980s.” International 
Affairs 61 (1) (Winter84): 91.  
Cheung, Mong. 2010. “Political survival and the Yasukuni controversy in 
Sino-Japanese relations. Pacific Review 23 (4) (09): 527-48.  
China Daily. “Ties with Japan important — Chinese public has increasingly 
harbored a global and wider diplomatic perspective in their view of relations 
with Japan”. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-08/16/content_11159605.htm. 
(accessed on Feb. 20th, 2011) 
China Economic Net. “Exchanges crucial to warm China-Japan ties Politics”. 
http://en.ce.cn/National/Politics/201108/12/t20110812_22613035.shtml#. 
(accessed on Aug. 22th, 2011)  
Clark, Christopher and Magdalene Lampert. 1986. “The Study of Teacher 
Thinking: Implications for Teacher Education.” Journal of Teacher Education, 
37: 27-31 
Coble, Parks M., and N. E. U. 2007. “China's ‘new remembering’ of the 
anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945.” The China Quarterly, 190: 
394-410.     
Darr, Benjamin Joseph. 2011. Nationalism and state legitimation in 
contemporary China. Ph.D. diss., The University of Iowa.   
Dawson, Richard E, Prewitt Kenneth and Dawson Karen S. 1977. Political 
socialization: An analytic study. Boston: Little, Brown.  
  
 
 
 
 
103 
 
 
Deans, Phil. 2007. “Diminishing returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine in the context of East Asian nationalisms.” East Asia: An 
International Quarterl,y 24 (3) (Fall2007): 269-94.  
Dittmer, Lowell, and Samuel S. Kim. 1993. China's quest for national identity. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Easley, Leif-Eric. 2009. “Problems of national identity and trust in 
Sino-Japanese relations.” Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association  
Easton, David, Dennis Jack and Easton Sylvia. 1969. Children in the political 
system: origins of political legitimacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Eto, Shinkichi. 1983. “Evolving Sino-Japanese relations.” Journal of 
International Affairs, 37 (1): 49.  
Fairbrother, Gregory P. 2002, “Political socialization and critical thinking: their 
influence of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese university students' attitudes 
toward the nation.” Ph.D. diss., University of Hong Kong. 
Fan, Yongming. 2008. “Searching for common interests between China and 
Japan: A Chinese view.” Journal of Contemporary China, 17 (55): 375-82.  
Friedman, Edward. 2010. “The politics of Chinese nationalism in Asia.” 
Harvard Asia Pacific Review.  
Fukuoka, Kazuya. 2011. “School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in 
Japan: A Study of Reception.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and 
Society, 24(3-4): 83-103.  
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and nationalism:New perspectives on the past. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Giroux, Henry. 1983a, Critical theory and educational practice, Deakin 
University, Victoria.  
Gong, Gerrit W. 1996. “Remembering and forgetting: the legacy of war and 
peace in East Asia.” Significant Issues Series. 18 (3).  
Gong, Gerrit W., and Victor Teo. 2010. Reconceptualising the divide :Identity, 
memory, and nationalism in Sino-Japanese relations. Newcastle upon Tyne 
England: Cambridge Scholars.  
Gries, Peter H. 1999, A "China Threat"? Power and Passion in Chinese “Face 
Nationalism”, World Affairs, 162 ( 2): 63-75. 
_____. 2004. China's new nationalism: Pride, politics, and diplomacy. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
_____. 2005. “Nationalism, indignation and China’s Japan policy.” The SAIS  
Review of International Affairs, 25(2): 105-114. 
Griswold, Wendy. 1994. Culture and societies in a changing world. Thousand 
Oaks: Pine Forge.  
Guo, Qijia, eds. 1995. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Fa Quanshu 
[Encyclopedia of Education Law of the People’s Republic of China], Beijing: 
Communication University of China Press.   
Hagström, Linus. 2008-2009. “Sino-Japanese relations--The ice that won't melt”, 
International Journal, 64 (11): 223-240.   
Hamada, Tomoko. 2003, “Constructing a national memory: a comparative 
analysis of middle-school history textbooks from Japan and the PRC.” 
American Asian Review, 21(4):109-144.  
He, Baogang, and Guo Yingjie. 2000. Nationalism, national identity and 
democratization in China. Aldershot; Brookfield USA: Ashgate.  
  
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
He, Yinan. 2007. “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging 
Sino-Japanese Conflict”, Journal of Contemporary China, 16(50): 1-24. 
_____. 2008. “Paths to reconciliation: Postwar Sino-Japanese relations in 
comparative perspectives.” Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association  
_____. 2009. The search for reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-polish 
relations since World War II. NY: Cambridge University Press.    
Heazle, Michael, and Nick Knight. 2007. China-Japan relations in the 
twenty-first century: Creating a future past? Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar.  
Hess, Robert D. and Judith Torney.1967.  The Development of Political 
Attitudes in Children. Venice: Aldine Press.   
Hirano, Mutsumi. 2009. History education and international relations: A case 
study of diplomatic disputes over Japanese textbooks. Folkestone: Global 
Oriental.  
Honda, Eric H. 2008. “Constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space: 
From structural factors to unitary actors.”  Conference Papers -- International 
Studies Association.  
Hu, Shaohua. “Why the Chinese are so anti-Japanese?”. 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_XIII_1.html. (accessed on 
Dec. 24th, 2010) 
Hughes, Christopher R. 2008, "Japan in the Politics of Chinese Leadership 
Legitimacy: Recent Developments in Historical Perspective", Japan Forum, 
20 (2): 245-266.  
Hughes, Llewlyn, and He Yinan. 2006. “Hot economy and cold politics?: 
Commerce and nationalism in Sino-Japanese relations.” Conference Papers -- 
International Studies Association  
Hyman, Herbert Hiram. 1969. Political socialization :A study in the psychology 
of political behavior. New York: Free Press.  
Institute of Japan Studies, CASS. 2002, “The First Survey Reports on 
Sino-Japanese Relations”, Japanese studies (Riben Xuekan), 6: 19-23. 
 ______. 2004, “The Second Survey Reports on Sino-Japanese Relations”, 
Japanese studies (Riben Xuekan), 6: 33-38.  
______. 2006, “The Third Survey Reports on Sino-Japanese Relations”, 
Japanese studies (Riben Xuekan), 6: 27-31. 
Itoh, Shoichi. 2008. “China’s surging energy demand: Trigger for conflict or 
cooperation with Japan?” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 25 (1): 
79-98.  
Jiang, Lifeng. 2005. “Patriotism and Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations” 
(Zhongri Guanxi zhong de Aiguozhuyi he Minzhuzhuyi), The Journal of  
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, April 25
th
, 
http://ijs.cass.cn/2005/0425/110.html. (accessed on Sep. 5th, 2010)   
Jiang, Wenran. 2006. “Nationalism and Sino-Japanese relations.” Conference 
Papers -- International Studies Association.   
Jin, Xide. 2001. Japan’s diplomacy and Sino-Japanese relations: new trend in 
1990s (Riben Waijiao yu Zhongri Guanxi: Ershi Shiji Jiushi Niandai 
Xindongxiang). Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe.  
Kecheng Jiaocai Yanjiusuo (Institute for Curricular Teaching Materials). 2001, 
20 Shiji Zhongguo Zhongxiaoxue Kecheng Biaozhun, jiaxue Dagang Huibian, 
  
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
Lishi Juan (Collected twentieth century curriculum standards and teaching 
outlines for Chinese secondary and primary school: history), Beijing, the 
People’s Education Press.  
Kobayashi, Yoshiki. 2008, "An Examination of Chinese Perception of Japan", 
Asia Studies (Azia Kenkyu), 54(4): 87-108.   
Koo, Min Gyo. 2009. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese 
political-economic relations: Cold politics and hot economics? Pacific Review 
22 (2): 205-32.  
Lall, Marie C. and Edward Vickers, eds. 2009. Education as a political tool in 
Asia. New York: Routledge.  
Langton, Kenneth P. and M. Kent Jennings.1968. “Political socialization and the 
high school civics curriculum in the United States.” The American Political 
Science Review, 62 (3): 852-867.  
Lemco, Jonathan and Scott B. MacDonald. 2002. “Sino-Japanese relations: 
Competition and cooperation.” Current History, 101 (656): 290.  
Lewis, Orion A. 2010. “Evolving chinese nationalism: From maoism to angry 
netizens.” Harvard Asia Pacific Review. 
Li, Haosheng and Shi, Cheng. 2005, “Nanjing Massacre from the Eyes of 
College Students – A Survey with 1000 Students from Universities in 
Nanjing” (Daxuesheng Qunti Yanzhong De Nanjing Datusha – Dui Nanjing 
Gaoxiao Yiqianming Xuesheng De Diaocha). Youth Studies (Qingnian Yanjiu), 
3: 9-16.   
Li, Weike. 2011, “Internal wars in Chinese Secondary School History Textbooks, 
1931-1951,” in Shin and Sneider, eds., History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: 
Divided Memories, (London and NY, 2011), p.140-153. 
Liao, Xuanli. 2007. “The petroleum factor in Sino–Japanese relations: Beyond 
energy cooperation.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (1): 23-46.  
Liu, Jiangyong. 2007, Zhongguo Yu Riben: Bianhua Zhong De “Zhengleng 
Jingre” Guanxi (China and Japan: the Changing Relations of “Cold Politics 
and Hot Economy”), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.. 
Los Angeles Times. “China Rewriting History like Japan’s, Chinese Textbooks 
Are Adept at Rewriting History.” 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/08/world/fg-history8. (accessed on Aug. 
25th, 2011 )  
Lovell, Julia. “It’s Just History: Patriotic Education in the PRC”. 
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/04/its-just-history-patriotic-education-i
n.html. (accessed on October 25th, 2011)  
Lu, Deping. 2003. “Japan in the eyes of Beijing's university students.” Chinese 
Education & Society, 36 (6): 55-65.  
Lu, Yeh-Chung. 2006. “Ascending China, ascending xenophobia? Understanding 
China's anti-Japanese sentiments.” Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association.  
Manicom, James and Andrew O'Neil. 2009. “Sino-Japanese strategic relations: 
Will rivalry lead to confrontation?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 
63 (2): 213-232.  
Manicom, James. 2008. “Sino-Japanese cooperation in the East China Sea: 
Limitations and prospects. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International & Strategic Affairs 30 (3): 455-78.  
Maurizio, Viroli. 1997. For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
  
 
 
 
 
106 
 
 
Nationalism, London: Oxford University Press. 
McPeck ,John E. 1981. Critical Thinking and Education, New York: St. Martin's 
Press.  
Michener, Roger. 1993. Nationality, patriotism, and nationalism in liberal 
democratic societies. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.  
Mitter, Rana. 2000. “Behind the scenes at the museum: Nationalism, history and 
memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997.” China 
Quarterly, 161 (03): 279-293.  
______ . 2003. “Old ghosts, new memories: China's changing war history in the 
era of post-Mao politics.” Journal of Contemporary History , 38(1):117-131.  
Moore, Gregory. 2010. “History, nationalism and face in Sino-Japanese 
relations.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 15 (3): 283-306.  
Morton Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi and Wang Jisi. 2002. China-Japan-U.S. 
relations: Meeting new challenges. Tokyo; New York: Japan Center for 
International Exchange.  
Ni, Yanshuo. 2005. “Remembering, never to forget.” Beijing Review 48 (37): 
16-21.  
Niquet, Valerie. 1995. “China and Japan: A balancing act.” Australia & World 
Affairs, 25: 18.  
Oksenberg, Michel. 1986. “China's Confident Nationalism.”Foreign Affairs, 65 
(3): 501-523 
Pan, Zhongqi. 2007. “Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands: 
The pending controversy from the Chinese perspective.” Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, 12 (1): 71-92.  
Pang, Shirang. 2005. “On Rational Patriotism—For the 60 Anniversary of the 
Victory of the War of Resistance against Japan” (Lun Lixing Aiguo—Jinian 
Woguo Kanrizhanzhen Shengli Liushi Zhounian). The Journal of Xianyang 
Normal University, 3:1-4.   
Qiang, Ming and Fairbrother, Gregory P. 2006. “Action Plan for Patriotic 
Education." Chinese Education & Society, 39 (2): 7-18. 
Qiu, Jin. 2008. “The politics of history and historical memory in China-Japan 
relations.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 11 (1): 25-53.  
Reilly, James 2004, “China’s History Activists and the War of Resistance 
Against Japan: History in the Making”, Asian Survey, 44(2): 276-294. 
Rose Caroline. 2000. “'Patriotism is not taboo': Nationalism in China and Japan 
and implications for Sino–Japanese relations.” Japan Forum 12 (2): 169-81. 
______. 2003. “Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the future?” 
London: RoutledgeCurzon.  
______. 2010. “Creating good citizens: ‘patriotic education’ in China and Japan 
since the 1990s and implications for Sino-Japanese relations.” Conference 
Paper- The Institute of Education, University of London.  
Oksenberg, Michel. 1986, “China’s Confident Nationalism”, Foreign Affairs, 
65(3):501-523.  
Sha, Sha. 2010, “A Social Psychological Analysis on the Factors of College 
Students’ Perceptions of Japan” (Daxuesheng Ribenguan Yingxiang Yinsu De 
Shehui Xinlixue Fenxi), Chinese Sociology (Zhoneguo Shehuixuewang), Mar. 
3, http://e-sociology.cass.cn/pub/shxw/zxwz/P020100303340333288691.pdf, 
(accessed on Sep. 25, 2011).   
Shang, Huipeng. 2004. “Rujia de Zhanlve Wenhua yu Zhongguoren Ribenguan 
  
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
de Shenceng” (The Confucian strategy and the deep layer of Chinese 
perceptions of Japan). Studies of International Politics, 92 (2): 60-69.   
Shen, Simon, and Mong Cheung. 2007. “Reshaping nationalism: Chinese 
intellectual response towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in 
the twenty-first century.” Pacific Review, 20 (4): 475-97.  
Shirk, Susan L. 2007. China: Fragile superpower. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Shuja, Sharif M. 1998. “China--Japan relations: From antagonism to 
adjustment.” Australia & World Affairs, 36 (03): 33.  
Smith, Paul J. 2009. “China-Japan relations and the future geopolitics of East 
Asia.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 35 (4): 230-256.  
Su, Zhuling. 2011, “The ‘Others’ in Chinese History Textbooks: A Focus on the 
Relationship between China and Japan,” in Gotelind Müller, ed. Designing 
History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational 
Aspirations, (NY, 2011): 149-150. 
Suzuki, Shogo. 2007. The importance of ‘Othering’ in china's national identity: 
Sino-japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts. Pacific Review 20 (1) 
(03): 23-47.  
Takeuchi, Hiroki. 2009. Perceptions and misperceptions of domestic politics in 
Sino-Japanese relations. Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association.   
The Daily Yomiuri. “China shouldn’t stir up anti-Japanese sentiment”. 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T100916003346.htm. (accessed Oct. 
5th, 2011) 
The Daily Yomiuri. “China’s youth have been raised to resent Japan”. 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T101021004669.htm. 
(accessed on Dec. 18th, 2010)  
Tian Huan, Ji Chaoqin, and Jiang Lifeng. 1997. Collections of literature on 
Sino-Japanese relations after WWII (1971-1995) (Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi 
Wenxianji, 1971-1995). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe.   
Tsang, Chiu-sam. 1967. Nationalism in school education in China. Hong Kong: 
Progressive Education Publishers.University of Minnesota Press.  
Wai, Yuk Chan. 2007. “Strategic understanding of Sino-Japanese relations: Case 
study of April 2005 demonstration in China.” Conference Papers-- 
International Studies Association.  
Wan, Ming. 2006. Sino-Japanese relations: Interaction, logic, and 
transformation. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
_____. 2010. “Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese relations in space and 
time.” Journal of Japanese Studies, 36 (1): 153-8.  
Wan, Wei. 2009, "The Fourth Survey Report on Sino-Japanese relations-- A 
Long-term, Arduous Process (Renzhong Daoyuan) to Promote Closed 
Relationships between Chinese and Japanese", Japanese Studies (Riben 
Xuekan), 2: 3-35. 
Wang, Baofu. 2004. “Let's get along.” Beijing Review, 47 (50) (12/16): 10-1.  
Wang, Dong. 2009. “Perceptions and misperceptions of power: The structural 
dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations.” Conference Papers -- International 
Studies Association.   
Wang, Yunsheng.1979. China and Japan during the past 60 years (Liushinian lai 
Zhongguo yu Riben). Beijing: Sanlian Shudian.   
  
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
Wang, Zheng. 2008. “National humiliation, history education, and the politics of 
historical memory: Patriotic education campaign in China.” International 
Studies Quarterly, 52 (4): 783-806.  
Weatherley, Richard and Michael Lipsky. 1977. "Street-Level Bureaucrats and 
Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform." Harvard 
Educational Review, 47 (02):171-197.  
Wen, Ji. 1996. “A lesson from history.” Beijing Review, 39 (41): 10.  
Whiting, Allen S. 1989. China eyes Japan. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
_____. 1995. “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng.” The China 
Quarterly, 142: 295-316. 
Whiting, Allen S. and Xin Jianfei. 1990. “Sino-Japanese relations: Pragmatism 
and passion.” World Policy Journal 8 (1): 107-35.  
Xu, Bin, and Xiaoyu Pu. 2008. Collective memory and nationalism in 
Sino-Japanese relations: The case of Chinese World War II reparation 
movements. Conference Papers -- International Studies Association.  
Yang, Jian. 2003. “Sino-Japanese relations: Implications for Southeast Asia.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 
25 (2): 306-27.  
Ye, Min. 2009. “Perception gap in Sino-Japanese economic relations.” 
Conference Papers -- International Studies Association. 
Zhang Yunling. 1997. China-US-Japan relations in transition (Zhuanbianzhong 
de Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe.   
Zhang, Boyu. 2009, “Chinese Youth Can Perceive Japan Rationally – An 
Analysis on the Survey Conducted with Chinese Youth in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Hohehot” (Zhongguo Qingshaonian Nenggou Lixing Kandai Riben – 
Beijing, Shanghai, Huhehaote Sandi Qingshaonian Duiri Yishi Diaocha Jieguo 
Fenxi), Japanese Studies (Riben Xuekan), 3: 131-144  
Zhao, Dingxin. 2002. “An angle on nationalism in China today: attitudes among 
Beijing students after Belgrade 1999.” The China Quarterly 172: 885-905. 
Zhao, Suisheng. 1988 “A State-led Nationalism: the Patriotic Education 
Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 31(3): 287–302.  
_____. 2000. “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations.” Political 
Science Quarterly, 115 (1): 1-33.  
______. 2004, A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese 
Nationalism, Stanford University Press, Stanford; CA. 
Zheng, Yongnian.1999. Discovering Chinese nationalism in China: 
Modernization and international relations. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Zheng, Zhifa. 2011. A New Study of Patriotic Education from the Perspective of 
Economic Globalization (Jingji Quanqiuhua Shiyuzhong de Aiguozhuyi 
Jiaoyu Xinlun). Beijing: Xiandai Jiaoyu Chubanshe.  
